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The Shadows of Litigation Finance 
Suneal Bedi* 
William C. Marra** 
Litigation finance is quickly becoming a centerpiece of our legal system. 
Once a dispute arises, litigants may seek money from third-party financiers to 
pay their legal bills or monetize their claims, and in turn those financiers receive 
a portion of any case proceeds. Yet policymakers are struggling with how to 
evaluate and regulate litigation finance. There are two problems. The first is an 
awareness problem. Some commentators consider litigation finance “likely the 
most important development in civil justice of our time,” but others have hardly 
heard of it. As a result, many policymakers do not quite understand what 
litigation finance is, how it works, and what is actually new about it. The second 
problem is analytical. There is no scholarly framework policymakers can rely 
on to evaluate whether litigation finance is actually good for the legal system 
and society. Moreover, the existing scholarship has overlooked important 
welfare effects, risking inefficient and suboptimal regulatory decisionmaking. 
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This Article addresses both problems. First, it articulates what exactly 
litigation finance is, who uses it, why they use it, and—most importantly—what 
is (and is not) new about this form of financing. Second, it provides a novel 
framework for analyzing the welfare implications of litigation finance. Existing 
scholarship focuses narrowly on the effects of litigation finance on behavior 
after a claim accrues and a litigant seeks funding. This Article’s framework 
provides new insights by explaining how litigation finance also significantly 
affects parties’ behavior before a legal dispute ever arises. Once these “pre-
claim” effects of litigation finance are understood alongside the “post-claim” 
effects that scholars have previously identified, it becomes clear that 
policymakers should encourage rather than obstruct litigation finance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you supply innovative parts to the world’s largest 
construction equipment maker. During a decades-long business 
relationship, you share your trade secrets under a confidentiality 
agreement. Then one day your customer, a Fortune 100 company, 
abruptly terminates your supply contract and starts using your 
proprietary information to make your parts itself. What can you do?1 
Maybe you have millions of dollars to pay a lawyer by the hour 
to bring your case. But litigation is expensive.2 You just lost your biggest 
contract, so money is in short supply. The cash you have, you need to 
rebuild your company. 
Maybe you can find a lawyer willing to litigate in exchange for a 
contingent fee. But few top-tier attorneys have the resources or risk 
tolerance to finance a complex case like yours. Even if you find such a 
lawyer, someone still has to pay the litigation costs, including expert 
witness fees and travel expenses. 
In the past, you might have dropped your case or settled for 
cheap. Today, you can seek litigation finance. A third-party investor can 
pay some or all of the fees and costs of your case in exchange for a share 
of the proceeds if you win. You can hire one of the country’s best law 
firms and possibly win the $100 million verdict you believe you are 
owed.3 Later, if your business needs cash while the defendant appeals, 
you can use litigation finance to monetize a portion of the judgment. If 
the defendant still refuses to pay, third-party financing can help pay for 
your enforcement and asset tracing efforts. 
Litigation finance is our civil justice system’s killer app. 
Unheard of yesterday, it is a mainstay today. Commercial litigation 
finance companies did not even exist in America until about 2006, the 
same year Twitter was founded.4 Until a few years ago, many lawyers 
 
 1. See Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 717 (N.D. Ill. 2014).  
 2. See Emery G. Lee III, Law Without Lawyers: Access to Civil Justice and the Cost of Legal 
Services, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 499, 503 (2015) (detailing how the rising cost of legal services impedes 
access to justice). 
 3. See Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10-cv-03770, 2017 WL 1196963, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 31, 2017) (noting that the jury returned a verdict in favor of Miller for $90.6 million, 
finding that Caterpillar misappropriated trade secrets and breached its contract). 
 4. A Brief History of Litigation Finance: The Cases of Australia and the United Kingdom,  
5 PRACTICE, Sept.–Oct. 2019, https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/article/a-brief-history-of-
litigation-finance [https://perma.cc/G5E4-XCV5] (identifying Credit Suisse’s 2006 Litigation Risk 
Strategies group as the first commercial funder in the United States); see also Maya 
Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1155, 1164 (2015) (discussing the 
launch of Juridica Investments in 2008 and Burford Capital in 2009). 
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had hardly heard of litigation finance.5 Yet today one of the few scholars 
who studies the industry proclaims it “likely the most important 
development in civil justice of our time.”6 Some estimate that billions of 
dollars of litigation finance investments are committed each year.7 This 
number will quickly grow.8 
Whether this is a good thing has been the subject of an infant 
but vigorous debate. Some scholars argue that litigation finance 
furthers the purposes of our legal system by ensuring legal outcomes 
track the strength of a party’s claim, not the size of its bank account.9 
Others disagree, suggesting that litigation finance will spur frivolous 
litigation and allow profit-seeking investors to take over our civil justice 
system.10 Similar disagreements concern whether litigation finance 
 
 5. A 2016 Burford Capital survey found that about one in three American lawyers was not 
even aware of the most basic litigation finance products. 2016 LITIGATION FINANCE SURVEY, 
BURFORD CAP. 8 (2016), https://www.burfordcapital.com/media/1263/litigation-finance-survey-
2016-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DUV-DEFD]. Three years later, Burford found that all respondents 
had at least heard of litigation finance. 2019 LEGAL FINANCE REPORT, BURFORD CAP. 7 (2019), 
https://www.burfordcapital.com/media/1662/2019-legal-finance-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
UL8L-MS7M]. 
 6. Maya Steinitz, Follow the Money? A Proposed Approach for Disclosure of Litigation 
Finance Agreements, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2019). 
 7. WESTFLEET ADVISORS, THE WESTFLEET INSIDER: 2020 LITIGATION FINANCE MARKET 
REPORT 4 (2020) https://advantage.westfleetadvisors.com/the-westfleet-insider-2020-litigation-
finance-market-report [https://perma.cc/B698-8YHX] (estimating that forty-six commercial 
litigation finance companies committed $2.47 billion in 2020). Because litigation funders 
frequently commit to pay for legal fees and costs as they are incurred over the life of a litigation, 
the committed capital is usually deployed over a multi-year period. 
 8. The addressable market has been estimated to be between $50 billion and $100 billion. 
Steinitz, supra note 6, at 1075; see Roy Strom, Nobody Knows Litigation Finance Size, but It’s  
Not $85 Billion, BLOOMBERG L. (June 11, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/nobody- 
knows-litigation-finance-size-but-its-not-85-billion [https://perma.cc/H698-X7XR] (noting, with 
skepticism, that a litigation financier estimated the addressable litigation finance market was  
$85 billion). 
 9. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can and Should the New Third-Party Litigation Financing 
Come to Class Actions?, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 109, 122 (2018) (explaining that litigation 
financing’s potential effects—increasing the number and length of litigated cases—increase the 
likelihood that cases will be resolved based on the merits, not based on the parties’ resources or 
risk tolerances); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural 
Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 101–02 (2010) (noting that the lack of market alternatives causes risk-
averse plaintiffs to settle prematurely relative to the lawsuit’s merits). 
 10. See, e.g., Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to 
the Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 613, 627–29 (2012) (arguing that litigation 
financing will increase the number of high-value frivolous claims and lawyers’ rent-seeking 
behavior to manipulate the common law toward favorable rules); Paul H. Rubin, Third-Party 
Financing of Litigation, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 673, 675 (2011) (contending that litigation finance  
will increase the cost and amount of litigation, as well as move substantive law in  
inefficient directions). 
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threatens the legal profession, interferes with counsel’s professional 
independence, and impairs the principle of party control.11 
This debate is kindling outside the academy too. “Third-party 
investments in litigation represent a clear and present danger to the 
impartial and efficient administration of civil justice in the United 
States,” warns the United States Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for 
Legal Reform.12 Most early court decisions have been more sanguine. 
Litigation finance “allow[s] plaintiffs who would otherwise be priced out 
of the justice system to assert their rights,”13 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court recently concluded, echoing a New York trial court’s earlier 
pronouncement that funding permits “lawsuits to be decided on their 
merits, and not based on which party has deeper pockets or stronger 
appetite for protracted litigation.”14 
These disagreements are fast bearing down on a three-front 
battle over the regulation of litigation finance. First, in Congress and 
statehouses across the nation, legislators are evaluating proposals to 
regulate litigation finance by, among other measures, mandating 
disclosure of funding agreements, capping funders’ returns, and even 
prohibiting entire categories of funding transactions.15 Second, bar 
associations and legal ethics committees are deciding whether litigation 
finance interferes with an attorney’s professional responsibilities, 
including whether litigation finance agreements between funders and 
law firms violate the prohibition against “fee-sharing” between lawyers 
and nonlawyers.16 Third, courts are increasingly asked to adjudicate a 
 
 11. For discussions of the ethical issues presented by litigation finance, see Susan Lorde 
Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the United States 
Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83 (2008) (arguing that litigation finance has the potential to be predatory 
and should therefore be regulated); Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal 
and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615 (2007) (detailing the ethical concerns raised by litigation 
loan agreements); Anthony J. Sebok, Should the Law Preserve Party Control? Litigation 
Investment, Insurance Law, and Double Standards, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 833 (2015) (suggesting 
that contracts selling litigation control should not be invalidated on public policy grounds, and 
arguing that litigation funding does not interfere with the lawyer-client relationship); W. Bradley 
Wendel, Paying the Piper but Not Calling the Tune: Litigation Financing and Professional 
Independence, 52 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2018) (explaining that, although financiers may participate in 
litigation for a variety of reasons including political, ideological, or personal, the funding market 
furthers public values and poses little risk to the professional responsibility obligations of lawyers). 
 12. John H. Beisner & Gary A. Rubin, Stopping the Sale on Lawsuits: A Proposal to Regulate 
Third-Party Investments in Litigation, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 1 (Oct. 2012), 
https://instituteforlegalreform.com/research/stopping-the-sale-on-lawsuits-a-proposal-to-regulate-
third-party-investments-in-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/D5G8-K5BE]. 
 13. Maslowski v. Prospect Funding Partners LLC, 944 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Minn. 2020). 
 14. Lawsuit Funding, LLC v. Lessoff, No. 650757/2012, 2013 WL 6409971, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Dec. 4, 2013). 
 15. For a summary of recent federal and state efforts to regulate litigation finance, see 
Steinitz, supra note 6, at 1076–81. 
 16. See infra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
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host of disputes related to funding, including whether litigation finance 
violates common law prohibitions against maintenance and 
champerty,17 whether litigation finance contracts are subject to usury 
laws,18 and whether funding documents and communications should be 
disclosed to opposing parties.19 
Because the world does not wait for the law reviews, these 
regulatory and judicial decisionmaking processes are threatening to 
outrun the infant scholarly debate about litigation finance. There are 
two major problems. The first is an awareness problem. Litigation 
finance remains in the shadows, poorly understood. Basic questions 
linger: What exactly is litigation finance? How does it work, and why do 
claimholders and law firms seek funding? Unfamiliarity breeds 
suspicion, and the suggestion that litigation finance is a new and 
undomesticated creature stalking our civil justice system underpins 
many demands for new regulations, new disclosure obligations, and 
new applications of the ethics rules.20 But how “new” is litigation 
finance? How exactly does it differ from the many ways third parties 
have long been allowed to pay a litigant’s legal fees, such as through 
contingent fee or pro bono litigation? Regulators and judges are ill-
equipped to decide whether litigation finance is a fearsome new 
Sasquatch or a minor adaptation of the fauna that have long populated 
our legal landscape. 
The second problem is an analytical one. Regulatory decisions 
must be informed by a view about whether funding is good or bad. 
Legislators, judges, and ethicists thus need a full accounting of 
litigation finance’s welfare effects. The literature does not yet provide 
this accounting. Existing scholarship contains a number of highly 
insightful analyses of litigation finance. But this literature surveys only 
half the field. The scholarship is almost exclusively forward-looking: it 
primarily studies litigation finance’s effects after a legal claim accrues 
and a party seeks funding—after, for example, our construction 
equipment manufacturer misappropriates its supplier’s trade secrets 
 
 17. Compare, e.g., Maslowski, 944 N.W.2d at 241 (abolishing Minnesota’s champerty 
doctrine), with Boling v. Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC, 771 F. App’x 562, 582 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(holding that a litigation finance transaction violated Kentucky’s champerty law). 
 18. Compare, e.g., Ruth v. Cherokee Funding, LLC, 820 S.E.2d 704, 710 (Ga. 2018) (holding 
that litigation finance transactions are not subject to usury law because repayment to funder was 
contingent on successful outcome of funded case), with Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 
2015 CO 63, ¶ 59 (holding that funding agreements are loans notwithstanding the lack of an 
absolute duty to repay). 
 19. Compare, e.g., Benitez v. Lopez, 17-CV-3827, 2019 WL 1578167, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 
14, 2019) (denying discovery into litigation finance documents), with Cont’l Cirs., LLC v. Intel 
Corp., 435 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1024 (D. Ariz. 2020) (granting in part and denying in part a request 
for discovery into litigation finance documents). 
 20. See infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. 
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and the supplier sues. For example, scholars have asked how, once 
funding is brought to bear in litigation, it influences which claims are 
brought, alters settlement incentives, and affects attorney-client 
privilege.21 These questions are important, but they tell only half the 
story. To fully appreciate litigation finance’s effects, we must look 
backwards as well as forwards. We must ask how funding affects 
parties’ behaviors before a litigant ever calls a funder, and indeed long 
before a legal dispute even arises in the first place. Until now, 
regulators and scholars have mostly ignored that litigation finance 
casts a long shadow behind as well as in front, affecting when and how 
people interact, contract, and negotiate in the real world. 
This Article addresses both problems. First, we attempt to solve 
the awareness problem by describing the most common litigation 
finance transactions, identifying why litigants and law firms seek 
funding, and situating modern litigation finance among the broad array 
of third-party funding arrangements that our civil justice system has 
long permitted and even encouraged. We argue, contrary to much of the 
scholarship and political rhetoric, that modern litigation finance is not 
different in kind from these other forms of third-party financing, such 
as contingency fee and pro bono litigation. Advocates of new regulations 
specific to the modern litigation finance industry need a theory about 
how litigation finance differs from these long-standing methods of 
third-party financing. 
Second, we fill the analytical void by exploring the broad shadow 
litigation finance casts on parties’ behaviors before a legal dispute 
arises. Focusing on corporate contracts, the leading subject of 
commercial litigation finance, we argue that litigation finance has at 
least three pre-dispute effects that scholars have overlooked: funding 
will make parties more likely to contract with each other; it will affect 
parties’ bargaining and contract design; and it will decrease inefficient 
breaches while still encouraging efficient breaches. Each of these 
impacts results from parties bargaining in the shadow of litigation 
finance, changing their behaviors because they know funding makes it 
 
 21. Some of the leading articles, all of which focus on funding’s effects after a cause of action 
accrues, include Ronen Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third-Party Litigation Funding — A 
Signaling Model, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 233, 244 (2014); Fitzpatrick, supra note 9; Keith N. Hylton, 
The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 701, 709–10 (2012); 
Molot, supra note 9; Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009); 
Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011) [hereinafter Sebok, The 
Inauthentic Claim]; Anthony J. Sebok, Selling Attorneys’ Fees, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207 (2018) 
[hereinafter Sebok, Selling Attorneys’ Fees]; Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic 
Conundrums in Search of a Solution: The Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 919 (2015); Steinitz, supra note 6; Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third 
Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011); and Wendel, supra note 11. 
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more likely that cash-strapped or risk-averse parties will be able to 
enforce at least some violations of their rights.22 
We pair these insights with the stuff of existing scholarship—an 
analysis of litigation finance’s effects on parties and the legal system 
after a legal claim accrues—to develop a unified framework for 
evaluating litigation finance’s total welfare impact. We hope this 
unified framework provides an important intervention in the policy 
debate about litigation finance. That debate, mirroring the scholarly 
discourse, focuses only on funding’s “post-claim” effects: its impact on 
society and the law after a claim accrues and funding is sought. If we 
continue to ignore the substantial “pre-claim” effects of financing, then 
the cost-benefit analyses conducted in statehouses, courthouses, ethics 
committees, and law reviews will overlook huge swaths of financing’s 
impact and reach suboptimal policy conclusions. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the 
background of litigation finance and attempts to solve the awareness 
problem. Part II lays out our unified framework, which considers both 
the pre-claim and post-claim effects of litigation finance. This Part also 
applies that framework in the contract setting and through a law and 
economics lens, and it concludes that litigation finance likely improves 
welfare and promotes efficiency in the marketplace. Part III shows how 
our unified framework can be applied in various normative ways  
to other kinds of legal disputes for which litigation finance is  
frequently sought. 
I. WHAT IS LITIGATION FINANCE? 
We describe the modern litigation finance industry by answering 
three questions. First, what do litigation finance transactions look like? 
Second, why do litigants and law firms seek litigation finance? Third, 
what (if anything) is new about litigation finance? 
A. What Do Litigation Finance Transactions Look Like? 
Litigation finance is the practice where a third party provides 
capital to a litigant or law firm in connection with a legal claim. 
Litigation finance is usually provided to plaintiffs seeking money 
 
 22. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968–69 (1979) (arguing that default legal rules in the divorce 
context affect negotiations and bargaining that occurs outside of the courtroom); see also Steven 
Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980) (arguing  
that known default damage awards make parties behave differently in the contracting  
negotiation phase). 
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damages.23 Defense financing is theoretically available, though in 
practice rarely provided.24 And litigation finance is usually provided by 
a funder with a profit motive. But it is sometimes offered to advance 
ideological rather than financial objectives, as in the well-known 
example of billionaire Peter Thiel financing Hulk Hogan’s invasion of 
privacy lawsuit against Gawker.25 
Our definition of litigation finance is broader than the narrower, 
more colloquial understanding of litigation finance as simply the 
practice where a third party pays some or all of the fees and costs of 
litigation on behalf of a claimholder in exchange for a share of case 
proceeds.26 This type of financing—we call it “fees and costs funding”—
is only one type of funding available, just like a wrench is one of  
many tools. 
The for-profit litigation finance industry starts from the premise 
that a legal claim is an asset, the same way a person’s home or a 
company’s inventory is an asset.27 Litigation finance allows 
claimholders, or law firms with contingent fee interests in claims, to 
secure financing against those assets, just as the owner of a home, 
factory, or account receivable may use those assets as collateral  
for financing. 
 
 23. See Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1276–77. Suits seeking purely injunctive relief are not 
normally candidates for funding from for-profit litigation funders, though there are exceptions. For 
example, funding is sometimes sought for section 337 investigations before the International Trade 
Commission (“ITC”). Although the ITC can only issue injunctive relief (usually in the form of an 
exclusion order) against the importation of foreign goods, parties before the ITC frequently settle 
claims for financial consideration. See Michael Kallus, Litigation Funding in ITC Investigations, 
WOODSFORD LITIG. FUNDING, https://woodsfordlitigationfunding.com/us/white-paper-llitigation-
finance-in-itc-investigations/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5X43-T9DK]. 
 24. For discussions of what defense-side litigation finance might look like, see Molot, supra 
note 21, at 378–79; and Emily Samra, Comment, The Business of Defense: Defense-Side Litigation 
Financing, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2299, 2326 (2016). 
 25. For a discussion of the Gawker suit, see Wendel, supra note 11, at 4–5. See also Lee 
Drucker, Don’t Judge Lawsuit Funders by Peter Thiel, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2016, 10:42 AM), 
https://on.wsj.com/2C6e5sE [https://perma.cc/79GG-6UE2] (contrasting Thiel’s litigation funding 
with the more common for-profit litigation finance). 
 26. See, e.g., Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-
Party Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 343, 350–51 (2011) (focusing on the 
“narrow” definition of funding as fees and costs funding); Michael K. Velchik & Jeffrey Y. Zhang, 
Islands of Litigation Finance, 24 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 36 (2019) (focusing on litigation finance 
investments where a funder “provides the party with the resources to hire a law firm’s lawyers to 
pursue the case or to maintain a law firm that is already on the case”). 
 27. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Commentary, On the Costs of Civil Justice, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2115, 
2115 (2002) (“A lawsuit is essentially a sale. The defendant buys a valuable asset from the plaintiff, 
in the form of a release of claims if the case is settled, or a verdict with res judicata effect if the 
case goes to a verdict.”); Molot, supra note 9, at 72 (characterizing a lawsuit as “an asset for the 
plaintiff and a liability for the defendant”); Anthony J. Sebok & W. Bradley Wendel, Duty in the 
Litigation-Investment Agreement: The Choice Between Tort and Contract Norms When the Deal 
Breaks Down, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1831, 1842 (2013) (“A cause of action is an asset whose value can 
be affected by the actions of the claimant and the claimant’s lawyer.”). 
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For plaintiffs, a legal claim’s value depends on the claimholder’s 
ability to convert that claim into an enforceable final judgment against 
a solvent defendant.28 To accomplish this task requires money—and 
often a lot of it—to pay for legal services.29 But no matter their economic 
condition, litigants have at least one asset for collateral: the legal claim 
itself.30 Litigation finance is most commonly used as project finance for 
legal claims, giving claimholders the capital they need to pay the legal 
fees and costs associated with bringing a case. This is very similar to 
using your new home as collateral for the mortgage you need to buy  
that home. 
What do funding transactions look like? With “fees and costs” 
funding, the funder usually pays some or all of the attorneys’ fees and 
costs of the litigation, in exchange for a share of case proceeds. In one 
common arrangement, the funder pays half of the attorneys’ fees, with 
the law firm forgoing payment on the remaining fifty percent of its fees 
in exchange for a share of case proceeds if the plaintiff wins.31 The 
funder may also pay half the “costs” of litigation, including expert fees, 
travel costs, and court filing fees, with the claimholder covering the 
balance.32 This arrangement ensures the claimholder and law firm each 
have “skin in the game,” or money at risk in the litigation. 
Because legal claims are assets, they can be monetized for 
purposes other than obtaining the fees and costs necessary to bring 
litigation. Instead of or in addition to providing capital to pay legal fees, 
 
 28. Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 927 (“Prosecuting litigation necessarily requires an 
immediate substantial capital investment for a remote future reward.”). 
 29. One study found that the median cost of litigation in the U.S. was $15,000 for plaintiffs 
and $20,000 for defendants, with the costs at the 95th percentile rising to $280,000 for plaintiffs 
and $300,000 for defendants. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR., 
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (Oct. 
2009), https://bit.ly/38ctzpY [https://perma.cc/UPN5-GUP2]. These numbers have led some to 
question whether concern about the mounting costs of litigation is overblown. See, e.g., Danya 
Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 
90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2012). But even $15,000 of litigation costs are outside the reach of many 
plaintiffs, while the complex commercial litigations that are usually the subject of commercial 
litigation funders typically have multimillion-dollar budgets. Lee, supra note 2, at 508–11. From 
a comparative perspective, one study found the United States ranks 99th out of 126 countries for 
affordability and accessibility of its civil justice system. William C. Silverman & Madison Marko, 
The Right to Counsel in Civil Proceedings: An International Perspective, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP: 
PROSKAUER FOR GOOD (Apr. 11, 2019), https://bit.ly/2Qf1ZQD [https://perma.cc/GNG7-A5T3]. 
 30. See David R. Glickman, Embracing Third-Party Litigation Finance, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1043, 1046 (2016) (the “most valuable asset” that claimholders own is frequently “their contingent 
claim to a future award of damages” in the case that needs financing). 
 31. David J. Kerstein & Wendie Childress, Mechanics of Litigation Finance, BLOOMBERG L. 
2 (Nov. 2019), https://bit.ly/31JEi90 [https://perma.cc/HSQ5-YTVE]; Understanding How 
Litigation Funding Enhances Attorney Effort, OMNI BRIDGEWAY: BLOG (July 8, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2SBppkS [https://perma.cc/56UJ-BCDV]. 
 32. Kerstein & Childress, supra note 31, at 2 (noting that litigation funders will often commit 
to paying a portion of case costs, with the claimholder responsible for the balance of costs). 
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litigation funders may give claimholders “working capital,” or funds 
paid directly to the claimholder for general personal or corporate 
purposes, such as to cover medical expenses or to help grow the 
claimholder’s business.33 For example, a litigation finance company 
could provide $1 million in working capital that a company can use to 
pay its employees or grow its business, with the funder’s investment 
repaid only from case proceeds if the company prevails in its litigation. 
Claimholders can seek funding at all stages of a case, from before 
a complaint is filed to after final judgment is entered. Most commonly, 
funding happens before the complaint is filed, with the claimholder and 
law firm needing funding to proceed with the litigation. Other times, 
the claimholder and law firm may have launched litigation without 
funding, but their financial situation changed mid-litigation, causing 
them to seek additional capital to finance discovery or trial. During the 
COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying economic crisis, many litigants 
in financial distress sought funding for cases that were already 
underway.34 Or a plaintiff whose favorable trial court judgment is on 
appeal may contract with a litigation funder to partially monetize the 
judgment, with the funder receiving a return if the judgment 
withstands appeal.35 After final judgment is entered, financiers 
sometimes provide resources to hire an asset-tracing or judgment-
enforcement firm, or the funder might simply monetize a portion of the 
plaintiff’s judgment, with the funder’s return coming from any amounts 
ultimately recovered from the defendant.36 
While most litigation finance transactions were initially single-
case, fee-and-cost funding agreements between a litigation funder and 
 
 33. Lee Drucker, Transaction Structures in Litigation Finance, LAKE WHILLANS, 
https://bit.ly/37lDyZ3 (last visited Dec. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/SK62-QQ4W] (“Most frequently, 
funds are used to pay for litigation fees and expenses, but it is also quite common for claimholders 
to take additional capital to use toward operating costs such as R&D, payroll, or manufacturing.”). 
 34. See Alaina Lancaster, Law Firms Flock to Litigation Funders Amid COVID-19 Outbreak, 
LAW.COM (Apr. 9, 2020), https://bit.ly/2BmiaYY [https://perma.cc/SFC3-CAPK]; Paige Long, 
Litigation Funding Demand Rises as Pandemic Suits Percolate, LAW360.COM (Nov. 6, 2020), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1326533/litigation-funding-demand-rises-as-pandemic-suits-
percolate [https://perma.cc/4JG3-TED6]; Annie Pavia, Litigation Finance Ready for Post-Covid 
Challenges, BLOOMBERG L. (May 18, 2020), https://bit.ly/3fFU4aR [https://perma.cc/ATV4-7CMU] 
(noting how litigation funders are well positioned for economic downturns); see also Steinitz, supra 
note 21, at 1283 (arguing that economic recessions “produce more claimants who possess less 
funding for, or at least less appetite to bear, litigation costs”). 
 35. See Courtney R. Barksdale, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits 
of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 711 (2007) (discussing appeals funding); Strategies, LAW 
FIN. GRP., https://www.lawfinance.com/strategies (last visited Feb. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ 
4PSN-H7AW] (listing appeal financing as one of four strategies the firm pursues). 
 36. Barksdale, supra note 35, at 712–13 (discussing funding for post-judgment situations); 
Legal Finance for Asset Recovery, VALIDITY FIN. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://bit.ly/2SDbta3 
[https://perma.cc/W5TN-ZBHR] (explaining that funders can monetize a portion of a judgment 
pending the completion of asset enforcement efforts). 
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a claimholder, an increasing number are agreements between a funder 
and a law firm.37 The funder’s investment is backed by the law firm’s 
contingent fee interest in litigation matters.38 Law firm funding is 
usually provided on a “portfolio” basis, with the funder’s investment 
secured by a basket of three or more matters.39 With portfolio funding, 
the funder frequently provides capital to the firm at fixed intervals, 
such as on a quarterly or monthly basis. These arrangements typically 
allow the law firm to use that capital to pay the costs associated with 
litigating those contingency fee cases or for general firm purposes, such 
as hiring new employees or investing in new practice areas. 
Virtually all litigation finance transactions are “nonrecourse,” 
meaning the funder’s return is secured only by proceeds from the 
funded case(s).40 If the case fails, the funder recovers nothing.41 The 
nonrecourse nature of litigation finance frequently makes it more 
attractive than taking out traditional debt, which imposes an absolute 
duty to repay the loan at set time intervals and usually requires 
collateral other than litigation proceeds.42 This feature of litigation 
finance can also make it more attractive than issuing equity (e.g., 
selling an ownership interest in a company to raise money to pursue 
litigation), since equity holders are usually entitled to returns from all 
of a business’s efforts and may have voting and control rights too.43 
 
 37. See WESTFLEET ADVISORS, supra note 7, at 6 (reporting that fifty-six percent of litigation 
finance capital was committed to law firm portfolios in 2020). 
 38. Molot, supra note 9, at 98–100. 
 39. See Victoria Shannon Sahani, Reshaping Third-Party Funding, 91 TUL. L. REV. 405, 417 
(2017) (discussing portfolio funding). 
 40. Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 21, at 244 (“Third-party financing, such as the 
consumer legal funding discussed in our signaling model, generally is in the form of nonrecourse 
loans and therefore does not require repayment to the funding company if the party recovers 
nothing.”). There are some exceptions to this rule, indicating the wide variety of transactions that 
may fall within the definition of “litigation finance.” For example, Burford’s “complex strategies” 
business line acquires assets whose value may increase due to litigation, but where “[i]n most 
cases, there is underlying asset value to support the position, in addition to potential value from 
legal or regulatory proceedings.” BURFORD CAPITAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2019, at 20 (2020), 
https://www.burfordcapital.com/media/1734/fy-2019-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC3V-9HXW]. 
 41. Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance 
Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 506–07 (2006) (“[L]itigation 
financiers offer nonrecourse funding—if the plaintiff ultimately loses her case at trial she has no 
obligation to repay the amount advanced, and the company thus forfeits its entire investment.”). 
 42. See J.B. Heaton, Litigation Funding: An Economic Analysis, 42 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 307, 
309–10 (2019) (“The non-recourse nature of most litigation-funding allows the litigant to protect 
the downside of a loss by trading to the funder more of the gains from a win.”). 
 43. See Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in 
Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561, 563 (2014) (discussing why litigation finance may 
be a more attractive means of financing litigation than other, more traditional, forms of financing). 
See generally Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
407, 413 (2006) (providing a taxonomy of shareholder rights). For the argument that litigation 
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The nonrecourse nature of litigation funding usually means 
funding is a riskier investment than many debt or equity transactions. 
So litigation finance as an asset class typically demands higher returns. 
The funder’s return is frequently expressed as a percentage of case 
proceeds, a multiple of the funder’s investment, or an accruing interest 
on the funding amount, with the return typically escalating over time.44 
Terms from publicly released commercial litigation finance contracts 
indicate that funders frequently seek a return of roughly two to six 
times their investment.45 In its 2019 annual report, Burford Capital, a 
publicly traded litigation finance company, reported an internal rate of 
return of about thirty percent over the past five years for its core 
business, with a net return on invested capital ranging between sixty 
and ninety-three percent.46 Of course, the return that funders seek 
varies depending on the matter’s risk profile. For example, appeals 
funding (cases funded only after a judgment has been entered in the 
district court and the defendant appeals) usually commands a lower 
return than funding presuit, because appeals present less merits risk 
(the claimant already won at trial) and less timing risk (the case is 
likely to resolve within two years). 
The for-profit litigation finance market consists of two mostly 
distinct segments: the commercial funding market and the consumer 
funding market.47 The commercial funding market typically involves 
larger transactions involving disputes between corporations, while 
consumer funders usually fund relatively small claims by individuals, 
especially for personal injury and medical malpractice claims.48 
 
finance transactions may be conceived of as equity investments with a limited right to a divided 
only from case proceeds, see Steinitz, supra note 4, at 1175. 
 44. See Ronen Avraham & Anthony Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third Party 
Consumer-Litigant Funding, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1134–35 (2019) (explaining that litigation 
funders’ returns are expressed “variously as a portion of the amount recovered, a multiple of the 
amount advanced, or a very high fixed interest rate on the amount advanced”). 
 45. See Purchase and Sale Agreement, List Interactive v. Knights of Columbus, No. 17-cv-
00210-RBJ (D. Colo. Dec. 31, 2019), ECF No. 267–2 (litigation funding agreement of LexShares, 
Inc.); Litigation Funding Agreement Between Legalist Fund II, L.P. & DiaMedica Therapeutics 
Inc. § 1.0 (Exhibit to Form 8-K, DiaMedica Therapeutics, Inc.) (Dec. 27, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2ZwmPAc [https://perma.cc/Y4EW-7BEZ] (defining the “Funder Recovery Amount” in 
a litigation finance agreement of Legalist, Inc.); see also W. Bradley Wendell, Are There Ethical 
Pitfalls in the Use of Third-Party Litigation Financing?, 80 ADVOC. (TEX.), Fall 2017, at 51, 52  
(stating that litigation finance returns often vary from two to five times the invested amount, with 
the return typically escalating the longer the litigation remains ongoing). 
 46. BURFORD CAPITAL, supra note 40, at 3. 
 47. See Sebok, supra note 11, at 842 (distinguishing between the commercial and consumer 
funding markets); Sebok & Wendel, supra note 27, at 1833 n.2 (discussing the bifurcated market 
and suggesting that funding to law firms may comprise a third segment). 
 48. Anthony J. Sebok, Litigation Investment and Legal Ethics: What Are the Real Issues?, 55 
CAN. BUS. L.J. 111, 113–14 (2014):  
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Commercial financiers include companies focused solely on litigation 
finance (including Burford, Lake Whillans, Omni Bridgeway, and 
Validity Finance) plus hedge funds and other strategic investors (e.g., 
the D.E. Shaw Group and Fortress Investment Group). One recent 
survey reported that, in 2020, there were forty-six commercial litigation 
funders active in the U.S. market, with a combined $11.3 billion of 
assets under management.49 Consumer funders include groups like 
LawCash, Mustang Funding, Oasis Financial, and U.S. Claims. 
The distinction between the commercial and consumer segments 
is important because some proposed and enacted regulatory schemes 
primarily regulate the consumer funding market, usually because such 
schemes apply only to transactions with natural persons, not 
corporations.50 This distinction mirrors the champerty and usury laws 
in some jurisdictions, which in many instances exempt from their scope 
the higher-dollar transactions typically found in the commercial 
funding market.51 This different treatment presumes that corporations 
are more likely to be sophisticated entities that do not need the benefit 
of consumer protection laws and that corporations are better off having 
access to high-cost financing than no financing at all.52 
We have focused here on the for-profit litigation finance 
industry. Scholars have also noted the existence of third-party 
financiers who fund lawsuits for an ideological or public-interest 
motive.53 One leading example is Peter Thiel’s financing of Hulk 
Hogan’s suit against Gawker in retaliation for Gawker “outing” Thiel.54 
The frequency of such third-party financing is difficult to track but 
 
In the consumer market an investor purchases a portion of a future recovery of a 
relatively small personal injury claim. . . . [In the commercial market] [t]he claim is not 
a small-value personal injury claim but a high-value commercial claim arising from a 
variety of causes of action, including fraud, contract, intellectual property rights, 
antitrust, and even qui tam. 
 49. WESTFLEET ADVISORS, supra note 7, at 4. 
 50. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3302(2) (2010); IND. CODE § 24-12-1-1(7) (2019); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 8, § 2251(2) (2019) (defining, in each state source, that consumers are persons or 
individuals for purposes of consumer litigation funding laws). 
 51. For example, New York’s champerty statute does not apply to transactions of at least 
$500,000. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489(2) (LexisNexis 2020); Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, 65 
N.E.3d 1253, 1254 (N.Y. 2016). Meanwhile the state’s civil and criminal usury laws do not apply 
to transactions of at least $250,000 and $2,500,000, respectively. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(6) 
(LexisNexis 2020). Usury laws typically do not apply to litigation finance transactions for the 
additional reason that those laws generally do not restrict nonrecourse transactions like litigation 
funding agreements. See supra sources cited in note 18. 
 52. See Marvin F. Milich, Incorporation to Circumvent Usury Laws: Associated Tax Problems 
and Law, 14 J. CORP. L. 527, 528–30 (1989) (explaining that most state usury laws do not apply  
to corporations). 
 53. See, e.g., Steinitz, supra note 6, at 1088–89; Wendel, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
 54. See Wendel, supra note 11, at 4–5, 17–19. 
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likely overstated—subject to the important qualification (discussed 
further below) that it is difficult to distinguish this form of third-party 
financing from ordinary pro bono litigation.55 
B. Why Do Litigants and Law Firms Seek Litigation Finance? 
It may seem novel for someone to obtain third-party financing to 
pay for litigation. But third-party financing in general is anything but 
new. Every day, companies and individuals use third-party financing to 
grow their businesses and pay for things they want or need. Mom-and-
pop bakeries take out lines of credit from their local bank; Silicon Valley 
startups raise venture capital; growth-stage companies obtain 
mezzanine debt or IPO; multinational corporations sell shares or issue 
low-yield debt. Individuals call on third parties to help finance the 
purchase of a new home, an education, or anything you can get with the 
swipe of a credit card. 
Why do companies and people use third-party financing? 
Usually because they need liquidity or want to share risk.56 Examples 
of people with liquidity problems include an entrepreneur toiling in her 
garage and needing money to build her brilliant widget, a chef needing 
cash to start his dream restaurant, or an individual needing credit to 
buy a new car. Others may wish to share some risk: companies or 
individuals may have the money to buy what they want, but they may 
prefer for someone else to share the downside financial risk in exchange 
for some upside if the venture succeeds.57 The capital markets—from 
retail banks to the New York Stock Exchange—help efficiently allocate 
capital from investors to liquidity- and risk-constrained doers and 
consumers, and they are a cornerstone of our economy.58 
Companies and people seek third-party litigation finance for the 
same reasons they seek third-party financing for anything else. 
 
 55. See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: 
Rethinking the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49, 59 
(2012) (briefly summarizing why companies and individuals may raise capital from third parties). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id.:  
The public capital markets are the backbone of our current economic structure for 
several reasons. First, enterprises frequently rely on these markets to raise money to 
support their operations. . . . Second, capital markets provide investors with the tools 
for risk management, such as security diversification and strategic hedging. Third, 
individual investors rely on the markets to finance retirement funds, supplement 
personal savings, fund higher education costs, and for other personal uses. 
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Claimholders and law firms usually want to solve either “liquidity 
constraints” or “risk constraints.”59  
Liquidity constraints typically take one of two forms. First, some 
claimholders cannot afford the expense of litigation. They do not have 
the thousands or millions of dollars it takes to litigate a complex civil 
case.60 The illiquid includes the destitute: poor individuals, bankrupt 
corporations, and so on. But others have liquidity constraints too. A 
claimholder may not be poor, but her money may be tied up elsewhere: 
say, paying off a mortgage or manufacturing widgets.61 And liquidity 
constraints are often a matter of degree, not kind. Litigants may be  
able to purchase the services of an average lawyer, but not  
first-rate counsel.62 Litigation finance helps address these liquidity  
constraints too. 
Second, claimholders might be liquidity constrained in that, 
wholly apart from (and often in addition to) lacking the resources to 
bring litigation, they need capital to meet their individual or corporate 
responsibilities. Someone might have medical bills she needs to pay—
bills often incurred because of the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing. Or 
a corporation might need capital to weather financial distress—once 
again, distress that might exist because of the defendant’s alleged 
wrongdoing.63 For claimholders who seek redress in the legal system, 
there is a time lag, often lasting years, between when the wrong is 
 
 59. For earlier discussions of liquidity and risk constraints in the context of litigation finance 
transactions, see Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 21, at 235; Heaton, supra note 42, at 309; 
Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 923–30. 
 60. Velchik & Zhang, supra note 26, at 19–20 (“[L]iquidity constraints would often prevent 
individuals with meritorious claims from litigation, because they could not afford to pay for 
litigation costs today and await for judgments for months, if not years.”). Individuals may litigate 
pro se, but successfully litigating a case pro se is beyond the ken of most individuals. Corporations 
generally are wholly prohibited from litigating pro se, even when the corporation has only a single 
shareholder. See Suneal Bedi, The Corporate Pro Se Litigant, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3550886 [https://perma.cc/63PM-RJDT]. 
 61. See Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 927 (“Most companies . . . have lucrative 
substitutes for the capital required to prosecute a complex commercial case, including developing 
new product lines, recruiting scarce or expensive talent, or expanding current manufacturing or 
distribution channels.”); Heaton, supra note 42, at 309 (“[Litigation funding] may allow a plaintiff 
that is not budget-constrained to finance the litigation without tapping other available cash, using 
that case for other purposes.”). 
 62. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 173–74 
(2014) (“Litigation finance enables the top-flight lawyer at an hourly fee firm to represent a small 
plaintiff with a meritorious claim even if the client cannot afford his or her hourly bills and his or 
her firm refuses to agree to contingent fee arrangements.”). Law firms are especially likely to face 
liquidity constraints in light of restraints that the legal ethics rules place on the ownership and 
capitalization of law firms. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Wendel, supra note 11, at 14 (noting that a large competitor might feel emboldened 
to misappropriate a smaller competitor’s trade secrets “kn[owing] that, even if it eventually lost 
the trade secrets lawsuit, protracted litigation would force the small company to pay out of pocket, 
tying up a significant amount of its current working capital in payments to lawyers”). 
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committed and when (if ever) the defendant pays damages.64 But many 
claimholders are most in need of capital when the wrong happens, not 
many years later when the defendant pays damages. They may 
immediately need operating capital to pay their bills, retain their 
employees, and keep their businesses running. The litigation claim may 
be their best (and perhaps their only) asset against which they can 
secure operating capital.65 
As for risk constraints: litigation is risky. Its ultimate outcome 
depends on a host of factors beyond anyone’s control or foresight.66 Will 
the key witness wilt on the stand? Will the plaintiff draw a sympathetic 
judge or jury? Will discovery reveal a smoking gun—or shoot the 
plaintiff in the foot? Will the defendants have enough resources at the 
end of litigation to pay an adverse judgment? Even the strongest legal 
claims are not sure bets, and even if they were, they would still bring 
uncertainties around how long the litigation will last and how much 
money the plaintiff will have to spend litigating the case. 
Risk constraints affect many litigation decisions. Most 
obviously, they affect a claimholder’s decision whether to litigate at all. 
Risk constraints might also affect how the litigation is conducted: 
whether a top-tier law firm is hired, or whether the litigant prefers to 
conserve her resources and instead litigate “on the cheap,” without the 
best attorneys or the necessary expert witnesses. Risk constraints also 
affect settlement decisions. Risk-averse claimholders may accept 
settlement offers well below the expected value of their claim in  
order to avoid putting further legal fees at risk in pursuit of an 
uncertain verdict.67 
Thus, many risk-averse litigants may possess valuable legal 
claims, but they may be unwilling to devote their finite resources to 
 
 64. See George Steven Swan, The Economics of Usury and the Litigation Funding Industry: 
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 753, 758 (2003) (“Nearly 
without exception, time favors a defendant. . . . Most plaintiffs settle because they are unable to 
wait the nearly two years elapsing before the average case comes to trial.”). The notion that “justice 
delayed is justice denied” is nothing new. See, e.g., Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing 
Delay in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 225, 230 (1997). 
 65. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 66. See J.B. Heaton, The Siren Song of Litigation Funding, 9 MICH. BUS. & 
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 139, 148–49 (2019) (identifying the many ways to lose in litigation, and 
arguing that for a single-count claim with four elements, there are fifteen ways to survive a motion 
to dismiss and sixty-five ways to lose); Molot, supra note 9, at 69–70 (discussing the range of 
outcomes that a sample personal-injury plaintiff may face during litigation). 
 67. Molot, supra note 9, at 69–70 (explaining that risk-averse plaintiffs in personal-injury 
lawsuits may settle for less than the expected value of their claim to avoid the risk of a very  
low recovery). 
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purchase legal services to pursue those claims.68 Litigation finance 
allows these claimholders to share two types of risk. First, the litigant 
may share the financial risk associated with paying lawyers to bring a 
case. This form of risk-sharing minimizes the claimant’s out-of-pocket 
cost in bringing the case. Second, the litigant may share some of the 
case’s upside in exchange for a partial payment or monetization today. 
As noted, the litigant may accept immediate working capital in 
exchange for giving the funder a larger portion of case proceeds should 
the matter prevail.69 
Further complicating our picture, a litigant’s liquidity and risk 
profile may change over the course of litigation. A claimholder may have 
sufficient liquidity to self-finance during the early stages of the case but 
may not be able to do so later on, perhaps because of ballooning 
litigation costs or a change in her financial resources. Similarly, 
claimholders who are otherwise willing and able to pay counsel an 
hourly fee to litigate their case at the outset may nevertheless want to 
hedge against possible changes in their liquidity or risk profiles at later 
stages of the case. 
Distinguishing between liquidity and risk constraints provides 
a useful lens for evaluating the rhetoric used about litigation finance in 
the public square. Proponents of litigation finance frequently 
emphasize financing’s role in assisting the liquidity constrained, 
classically expressed as helping David battle Goliath.70 Few people 
publicly oppose the use of litigation finance to help claimholders who 
have strong legal claims that they would pursue but for their ability to 
afford legal services. 
Opponents of litigation finance, like the Chamber of Commerce’s 
Institute for Legal Reform, emphasize instead funding’s effect on the 
risk-constrained. They argue, for example, that litigation finance 
promotes frivolous litigation because there may be circumstances where 
a claimholder is unwilling to risk her own capital to self-finance a case, 
 
 68. See Wendel, supra note 11, at 14:  
During the time the lawsuit was pending, the small company would not be using its 
capital to innovate and compete more effectively against the large manufacturer. 
Litigation financing thus offers litigants the opportunity to make more productive use 
of their working capital, rather than dissipating it on the expenses of litigation;  
Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 927 (“Companies with outside investors are also hesitant to 
incur voluntary expenses with uncertain prospective payoffs because they must justify these 
expenses both directly to investors and through publicly available reports and metrics.”).  
 69. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 115 (“The virtue of the new, claim-investing financing is 
that it mitigates the problem of risk imbalance. Now, the risk-averse plaintiff can simply sell some 
or all of its claim to a third-party financier who is risk-neutral.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Bruno Deffains & Claudine Desrieux, To Litigate or Not to Litigate? The Impacts 
of Third-Party Financing on Litigation, 43 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 178, 180 (2015); Rodak, supra 
note 41, at 514–15; Wendel, supra note 11, at 9–10. 
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but a third-party funder with a different risk profile would finance the 
matter.71 Proponents of litigation finance embrace funding’s effect on 
the risk-constrained, contending that it is good for risk-averse plaintiffs 
to share risk with a third party and thereby avoid settling for less than 
the full value of their claim.72 But note that even if the Chamber’s 
argument is correct with respect to the risk constrained, it does not 
speak to litigation finance’s value to the liquidity constrained.  
The foregoing analysis situates third-party funding for litigation 
as consistent with the well-established practice of companies and people 
using third-party funding for nearly the entire spectrum of human 
pursuits, like building a business or financing the purchase of a new 
home. But if we are comfortable with third-party financing when it 
comes to just about any other purpose, why the reluctance to embrace 
this financing to pursue litigation? There is a widespread assumption 
that there is something new or different about third-party funding to 
pursue litigation. We turn to that issue now. 
C. What (If Anything) Is New About Litigation Finance? 
Scholars and commentators widely agree that litigation finance 
is new. They have described litigation finance as a “new field,”73 a 
“nascent but fast-growing” industry,74 a novel practice that “takes 
getting used to,”75 and even a “new twist on legalized gambling.”76 The 
assumption that litigation finance is “new” underpins efforts to regulate 
the industry. The Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform 
has warned about the “recent growth of third-party litigation financing 
in the United States” and has argued that financing was not 
popularized until 1998.77 Senators Chuck Grassley and John Cornyn, 
sponsors of federal legislation to require disclosure of financing 
 
 71. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Litigation Finance and the Problem of Frivolous 
Litigation, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 195, 197 (2014) (arguing that litigation finance may result in the 
filing of “low-probability lawsuits” that claimholders might not bring on their own); Beisner & 
Rubin, supra note 12, at 4 (arguing that litigation funders can pool risk and thus bring individual 
cases that would not be brought without risk pooling). 
 72. Molot, supra note 9, at 101–02. 
 73. Rodak, supra note 41, at 503. 
 74. Steinitz, supra note 6, at 1089. 
 75. Lincoln Caplan, Lawyers and the Ick Factor, NEW YORKER (July 9, 2015), 
https://bit.ly/3hAnZCY [https://perma.cc/X7D3-J78G]. 
 76. Elizabeth Sniegocki, The Advanced Litigation Funding Industry: Gambling on Justice?, 
FLA. UNDERWRITER, May 2003, at 29, 29. 
 77. John Beisner, Jessica Miller & Gary Rubin, Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third-
Party Litigation Funding in the United States, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 2–3 (2009), 
https://bit.ly/2N4MXwe [https://perma.cc/PGF2-3GBX]. As noted earlier, however, the commercial 
section of the litigation finance market more accurately dates to around 2006. 
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agreements in certain matters, have described litigation finance as a 
“burgeoning industry” that has recently enjoyed “rapid expansion.”78 
To be sure, the legal market has long been regulated in a way 
that resists third-party financing of litigation. Lawyers are limited in 
their ability to obtain third-party financing by an ethics rule that 
prohibits lawyers from “sharing fees” with nonlawyers except in certain 
limited circumstances.79 Most jurisdictions prohibit the assignment of 
personal injury claims, while many states prohibit the assignment of 
other claims such as fraud and professional malpractice.80 Common law 
prohibitions on maintenance and champerty, which originated in 
England and were adopted in some states, prohibit “officious 
intermeddlers” from financing the litigation of others.81 Each of these 
restrictions limits or prohibits some methods of third-party financing 
for legal claims. 
Yet it would be odd to find that third-party funding did not 
already exist in the law, particularly given that, as noted, in contexts 
other than litigation, companies and people rely on third-party 
financing all the time to manage their liquidity and risk constraints.82 
Indeed, it turns out that for centuries, litigants have found ways to 
share the costs of litigation with third-parties, notwithstanding the 
formal restrictions on third-party financing of litigation. 
If there is a wall against third-party financing of lawsuits, it is 
a wall of Swiss cheese, with many holes that permit some—but not all—
types of third-party financing to pass through. It is more accurate to say 
that our legal system bans some methods of third-party financing, while 
allowing others. Here, we identify some permissible methods of third-
party financing, and we draw out two themes that apply to each of these 
methods. First, whether a litigant’s claim is eligible for some of these 
“permissible” forms of third-party financing often depends on reasons 
having little to do with the strength of that party’s claim. Second, these 
accepted forms of third-party financing are not hidden or obscure.  
They are well-established, long-accepted features of our legal system 
 
 78. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm., & John 
Cornyn, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Const., to Charlie Gollow, Managing Dir., Bentham IMF 1–
2 (Aug. 27, 2015), https://bit.ly/3fAIPQV [https://perma.cc/2V3S-6VZA]. 
 79. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.4(a)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). Some variant of 
this rule has been adopted in every state and in the District of Columbia. Sebok, Selling Attorneys’ 
Fees, supra note 21, at 1218. For a discussion of the prohibition against fee sharing in the context 
of litigation finance transactions, see Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1291–92. 
 80. Sebok, supra note 11, at 862; Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 21, at 62. 
 81. For background on the ancient prohibitions against champerty and maintenance, see Max 
Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48 (1935). For a discussion of the doctrines 
in the context of litigation finance transactions, see Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1286–91. 
 82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
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that do not generate the same controversy as the modern litigation  
finance industry. 
The most familiar method of third-party financing is the 
contingency fee, which allows lawyers to finance their clients’ litigation 
in exchange for a share of case proceeds.83 Contingency fee agreements 
allow illiquid or risk-constrained litigants to permit lawyers to bear 
some or all of the financial costs and risks of litigation in exchange for 
the attorney receiving a share of the rewards if the matter succeeds.84 
Contingency fee litigation thus achieves the same end as the “fees and 
costs” litigation finance arrangements discussed above: the claimholder 
trades away a portion of the case upside in exchange for assistance 
meeting the financial burdens of litigation. Indeed, fees and costs 
funding usually pairs litigation finance with a “hybrid” contingency fee 
arrangement, because law firms typically discount their hourly rates in 
exchange for a contingent share of case proceeds upon success. 
Pro bono litigation provides another example of third-party 
financing of litigation. Organizations like the ACLU, the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, and the Becket Fund, among many others, are third 
parties to litigation that raise funds from donors and then use those 
funds to finance litigation on behalf of claimholders.85 “Because 
financing litigation—particularly Supreme Court litigation—is well 
outside the means of the average citizen, civil liberties require 
coordination among financiers to effect social change.”86 Unlike the 
controversies surrounding modern litigation finance, pro bono litigation 
is not viewed as a bug in the legal system. It is instead considered an 
indispensable and highly desirable feature of the legal firmament.87 
 
 83. Molot, supra note 9, at 90 (“The principal market for litigation claims in this country is 
found in the contingent fee system.”); Velchik & Zhang, supra note 26, at 15–16 (identifying the 
contingency fee agreement as a form of third-party financing for litigation). 
 84. Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market 
for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 646 (1995) (describing the contingency fee arrangement 
as a risk-sharing device between plaintiff and lawyer, where the lawyer is better able to diversify 
against the risk that any one litigation will fail); Velchik & Zhang, supra note 26, at 19 (with 
contingency fee agreements, “[t]he litigant benefits from being able to pursue his claim though he 
may otherwise lack the means to pay a lawyer upfront”). 
 85. See Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1298–99 (noting the similarities between commercial 
litigation financing and pro bono litigation, the latter of which “eliminates litigation costs” and 
“therefore alters the power dynamics among attorneys, their clients, and opposing parties”). 
 86. Velchik & Zhang, supra note 26, at 17 (footnote omitted). 
 87. It is especially hard to distinguish traditional pro bono litigation from third-party 
financing of litigation like Peter Thiel’s funding of Hulk Hogan’s lawsuit against Gawker. In each 
instance, a third party finances the lawsuit of a claimholder to vindicate the claimholder’s claimed 
rights. As a result, it is difficult to draft a regulation that would ban third-party funding like Thiel’s 
but would allow traditional forms of pro bono litigation involving constitutional or statutory rights, 
like challenges to bail laws or restrictions on abortion or religious liberty. Indeed, pro bono 
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There are other common methods of third-party financing of 
litigation. Family members, friends, and employers sometimes pay 
litigation expenses on behalf of loved ones or employees. The classic 
example is a parent who pays her adult child’s divorce fees, or a wealthy 
benefactor who helps a friend injured in a car accident bring a civil 
claim against the reckless driver. Companies frequently pay the defense 
costs of (and money judgments against) directors or officers sued for 
breach of fiduciary duty. Similarly, state and federal governments 
typically pay the legal defense costs of (and, again, judgments against) 
officers sued for violations of constitutional rights. The legal ethics rules 
expressly permit these types of third-party financing.88 
There are other examples too, each of which, like several of the 
examples just mentioned, involves a third-party funder with a profit 
motive. Consider insurance subrogation: an insurer pays a claimholder 
(say, the victim of a botched medical procedure or car accident) and then 
sues the wrongdoer hoping to recover the money it paid the 
claimholder.89 Or think about bankruptcy claims trading, where 
creditors may freely sell their claims to third parties willing to undergo 
the time and expense of litigating those claims.90 Parties may assign 
their contract rights, and creditors may sell their debt to third parties.91 
Each of these instances involves a claimholder sharing with a third 
party some or all of the financial risks of litigation. 
Another analogue to modern litigation finance has gone 
relatively unnoticed in the literature: claimholders that need financing 
to bring legal claims can simply raise traditional equity or debt 
financing to do so. A company can seek out new equity investors or 
creditors who provide capital the company needs to litigate its claims. 
But a company’s ability to bring on equity or debt investors to finance 
 
litigation, like contingency fee litigation and modern third-party funding, has previously been 
attacked as violating champerty laws. See Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal 
Champerty or New Business Opportunity?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 491 (1992). One might argue that 
pro bono litigation is usually brought against government entities better able to bear litigation 
defense costs, but some targets of “cause” litigation—which is often brought on a pro bono basis—
are private entities. See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), aff’d sub 
nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020) (addressing whether Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in the context of lawsuits 
against private employers); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard 
Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (addressing whether Title VII prohibits the affirmative 
action program of Harvard College). 
 88. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (acknowledging that 
a third-party may “pay[ ] the lawyer to render legal services for another,” but prohibiting that  
third party from “direct[ing] or regulat[ing] the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such 
legal services”). 
 89. Velchik & Zhang, supra note 26, at 26. 
 90. Id. at 28–29. 
 91. Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1296–97. 
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litigation will often vary for reasons having nothing to do with the 
strength of the party’s legal claim. Some very strong companies may be 
able to raise such financing: their core businesses may be sufficiently 
robust and attractive to investors that they can easily raise new rounds 
of capital to finance litigation or pursue other corporate objectives. Very 
weak companies may also be able to raise such financing, particularly 
where the company is so infirm that it is no longer an operating entity 
and is worth only the value of the litigation claim. In that circumstance, 
the company (which might have been put out of business by the 
defendant’s allegedly wrongful acts) can sell equity shares in exchange 
for the capital necessary to pursue litigation.92 This phenomenon is 
often observed in patent litigation, where the asset that is the subject 
of litigation—the patents—are readily alienable and may be easily 
transferred from one owner to another.93 But many companies are less 
capable of raising equity and debt financing specifically for litigation 
purposes—perhaps because the company does not have a strong enough 
core business to attract investors, yet the company is worth more than 
the value of the litigation claim. 
The possibility of companies raising equity and debt financing to 
fund litigation raises at least two problems relevant to the regulation of 
litigation finance. First, as discussed, a company’s ability to raise third-
party funding is often uncorrelated with the strength of that party’s 
claim. It follows that from an efficiency perspective, any ban or 
limitation on modern litigation finance will be underinclusive, almost 
arbitrarily prohibiting some claimholders with meritorious claims  
from obtaining financing while allowing others to obtain the funding 
they desire. 
Second, the ability to raise equity or debt financing suggests that 
any prohibition on commercial litigation finance may be difficult to 
police. For example, corporate claimholders could structure third-party 
litigation finance transactions as equity investments, with the 
investor’s return coming from a special class of stock whose worth is 
tied solely to the outcome of one or more litigations. Indeed, there are 
already some documented instances where litigation finance 
transactions have taken the form of investments in special classes of 
stock or special purpose vehicles, allowing the investor’s return to come 
 
 92. See Steinitz, supra note 4, at 1192 (describing the Crystallex litigation). 
 93. The Patent Act provides that patents “shall have the attributes of personal property” and 
that patents are assignable. 35 U.S.C. § 261. See generally Erik Hovenkamp, Competition, 
Inalienability, and the Economic Analysis of Patent Law, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 33, 47–48 (2018) 
(discussing the alienability of patent rights). 
            
586 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3:563 
only from litigation proceeds.94 This way of structuring third-party 
litigation finance would be consistent with long-standing methods of 
third-party financing that have always been permitted, and it is 
difficult to see why one form rather than the other should make a 
difference for regulatory purposes. 
More broadly, the prevalence of the methods of third-party 
financing we have just discussed presents challenging theoretical and 
practical problems for regulators. Assuming regulators will not rid the 
legal system of these long-standing forms of third-party financing—
contingency fee litigation, pro bono litigation, bankruptcy claims 
trading, equity and debt financing, and so on—a theory is needed for 
why modern commercial litigation finance ought to be regulated 
differently than these other forms of financing. As noted, the ethical 
rules do not outlaw these forms of third-party financing, nor do statutes 
or court rules generally require mandatory disclosure of most of these 
forms of third-party financing. And if regulations apply to only modern 
litigation finance, these regulations may be circumvented, especially by 
structuring the investment so that financiers stand as shareholders of 
a company. Regulators could presumably go even further and actually 
prohibit entire categories of corporate shareholder interests and 
governance rights, but this would demand far-reaching intrusion into 
long-accepted private corporate structures that will likely meet 
significant resistance. 
It follows that litigation finance is not different or new in kind. 
Third-party financing has long been a mainstay of our legal system. But 
the modern litigation finance industry is different in degree from prior 
methods of third-party financing. The rise of litigation finance as an 
asset class has made available billions more dollars specifically 
dedicated to addressing claimholders’ liquidity and risk constraints. 
Claimholders who previously have been unable to obtain the various 
other forms of third-party funding may now obtain modern litigation 
funding. And even claimholders who could obtain the other forms of 
third-party funding may find that litigation finance provides a more 
efficient way to finance litigation. 
Consider the contingency fee. There are restrictions on the 
contingency fee market that make it inefficient and inadequate to the 
needs of many litigants. First, only lawyers may practice law, giving 
attorneys as a class a monopoly on legal fees.95 While there should exist 
 
 94. For a discussion of specific instances where litigation finance transactions have taken the 
form of investments in special classes of stock or spin-off special purpose vehicles, see Steinitz, 
supra note 4, at 1175–97. 
 95. Painter, supra note 84, at 655–56. 
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price competition among lawyers, some scholars have argued that 
lawyers charge higher contingency fee rates, in the form of  
larger percentages of case proceeds, than they could in a fully  
competitive market where nonlawyers could compete to provide third-
party financing.96 
Second, many of the largest, best-financed law firms are 
reluctant to litigate cases on contingency fee, limiting the supply of 
high-quality providers of contingency fee litigation.97 There are many 
reasons why. One culprit is the ethical rule against fee sharing, which 
generally prohibits lawyers from sharing fees with nonlawyers.98 The 
rule limits lawyers’ ability to avail themselves of third-party capital to 
share business risk (including the risk of contingency fee litigation).99 
It is why billion-dollar law firms are run as partnerships, why no law 
firm is publicly traded in the United States, and why law firms are 
arguably particularly fragile business entities especially prone to 
collapse during difficult economic times.100 Organizational factors play 
a role too. Many major law firms are led by corporate and defense-side 
litigation counsel who made their careers on the billable hour and resist 
putting the firm’s resources at risk so that other (frequently more 
junior) attorneys at the firm can pursue plaintiff-side litigation on a 
contingency fee. 
Third, legal ethics rules also constrict the range of financial 
solutions that law firms may offer clients. Lawyers may provide legal 
services to clients in exchange for a contingent fee, and they may 
advance court costs and expenses of litigation (e.g., expert fees and filing 
fees).101 But lawyers may not otherwise provide “financial assistance to 
a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation.”102 In 
other words, the ethical rules prohibit lawyers from directly purchasing 
 
 96. Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 738 (2005) 
(“[M]arkets for contingency lawyers exhibit little price competition, in part because litigants may 
interpret a low contingency fee as a signal of a low-quality lawyer.”); Lester Brickman, The Market 
for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 126 
(2003) (concluding that the market for contingent fee arrangements is not price competitive); 
Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 
37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 105 (1989) (arguing in particular that the existence and durability of the 
standard one-third contingency fee reflects the lack of price competition among lawyers). 
 97. Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 929–30. 
 98. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (stating that “[a] 
lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer” other than in the case of certain 
narrow enumerated exceptions). 
 99. Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 929–30. 
 100. See John Morley, Why Law Firms Collapse, 75 BUS. LAW. 1399 (2020). 
 101. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (permitting lawyers to 
provide legal services in exchange for a contingent fee); id. r. 1.8(e) (permitting lawyers to advance 
court fees).  
 102. Id. r. 1.8(e). 
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a portion of the client’s claims or from providing the client with 
operating capital they can use for general business purposes.103 Thus 
while lawyers can help clients reduce their out-of-pocket costs of 
litigation (the equivalent of “fees and costs” funding provided  
by litigation funders), they cannot put money in their clients’  
pockets today. 
Litigation finance addresses each of these limitations of the 
contingency fee arrangement. First, litigation financiers introduce 
greater competition into the market for legal services, allowing 
financiers and law firms to compete on price (i.e., the percentage 
interest in case proceeds payable upon success).104 Second, litigation 
financiers provide capital that allows law firms to litigate plaintiff-side 
cases that they otherwise would be reluctant to pursue on a purely 
contingent fee basis.105 Third, litigation financiers can provide a broader 
suite of options to liquidity- and risk-constrained clients. Distressed or 
risk-averse clients can obtain “working capital” to grow their business 
during the litigation, instead of waiting until the end of litigation to 
recover, by which time a damages award may be too late to save the 
company or individual from bankruptcy.106 
II. A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING LITIGATION FINANCE 
The academic and regulatory debates about litigation finance 
reflect efforts to understand litigation finance and its impact on society. 
Our discussion to this point has defined litigation finance in relation to 
long-standing efforts by companies and people to obtain third-party 
financing, to pursue either litigation or any other corporate or personal 
goal. We now develop a framework for evaluating litigation finance’s 
welfare effects. 
Our central claim is that litigation finance casts broad shadows 
both before and after litigation: it influences parties’ behaviors after a 
 
 103. See Molot, supra note 9, at 91. 
 104. See de Morpurgo, supra note 26, at 380 (“[T]he benefits from a competitive market for 
litigation financing could be substantial, as competition among litigation financing companies 
would induce them to offer financing for percentages of awards closer to the real expected costs  
of financing.”). 
 105. Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 929–30. 
 106. See Wendel, supra note 11, at 14–15 (discussing how litigation finance alleviates working 
capital constraints for litigants who might not otherwise be able to bring expensive suits). Just as 
there are questions today about whether litigation finance violates prohibitions against 
champerty, contingency fee agreements were prohibited as champertous at common law in 
England and antebellum America. Painter, supra note 84, at 639; Velchik & Zhang, supra note 26, 
at 20. The agreements were gradually allowed, however, and by 1876 the United States Supreme 
Court declared that the permissibility of contingency fee agreements was “beyond legitimate 
controversy.” Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 556 (1876). 
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legal claim accrues and a party seeks funding, but it also influences 
behavior before a legal dispute ever arises. The existing scholarship 
focuses almost entirely on funding’s “post-claim” shadow, studying how 
funding affects the legal system and the legal profession once a wrong 
has been committed and a litigant considers suit.107 These insights are 
important, but they tell only half the story. A complete account of 
financing’s welfare effects must also study in detail its impact on 
behavior before a legal claim accrues. Indeed, these “pre-claim”  
effects may be among the most important and lasting effects of 
litigation finance. 
Our unified framework combines these pre- and post-claim 
effects of litigation finance. We do not purport to identify every effect 
that litigation finance has in the full variety of contexts and claims 
where it might be used. Instead, our goal is to illustrate that financing 
has both pre- and post-claim effects, to identify some of those most 
important effects, and to demonstrate how our unified framework might 
be used to evaluate litigation finance’s welfare effects. 
In developing and applying our framework, we limit the scope of 
our analysis in two ways. First, we discuss a particular legal context: 
the contract action. Contract actions provide an effective context for 
examining litigation finance’s welfare effects because breach of contract 
suits are a leading subject of commercial litigation finance agreements 
and because two-party contracts present a simple example of a bilateral 
relationship between two parties whose conduct might vary depending 
on the presence of financing.108 
Second, while we acknowledge that litigation finance may be 
evaluated using various normative lenses, we will evaluate its welfare 
implications using a law and economics framework.109 Under this 
 
 107. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 21 (providing examples of existing scholarship that 
focuses on post-claim financing). 
 108. For example, contract actions typically provide the canvas for law-and-economics studies 
of the law, even if that school’s insights extend to other areas of the law. See, e.g., S. Todd Lowry, 
Bargain and Contract Theory in Law and Economics, J. ECON. ISSUES, Mar. 1976, at 1 (analyzing 
further the underlying concepts of Coase’s bargaining theory); Richard Posner, The Law and 
Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2004) (bringing contractual 
interpretation into the general discussion of contract formation); Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, 
The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting, J.L. ECON. & ORG., Apr. 2004, at 2–3 (discussing 
whether costly negotiation in contracting settings promotes efficiency). 
 109. The choice of which framework to apply is a classic problem in analyzing laws, reforms, 
and other interventions. It is not enough to simply identify behavioral changes. One must then 
apply a normative lens to evaluate whether those behavioral changes actually promote some end 
goal. Of course, these end goals are often not agreed on. In this Section, we simply choose one end 
goal (efficiency) and evaluate it using our framework to determine whether litigation finance 
promotes efficiency. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What Can 
Be Gained by Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 329, 331 (1998) (arguing that 
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framework, a regulation, intervention, or action is welfare enhancing if 
it moves the system closer to Pareto efficiency.110 Pareto efficiency is the 
state of affairs where nobody can be made better off without making 
somebody worse off.111 We select a law and economics framework for 
several reasons. Law and economics is a natural fit for evaluating a 
financial marketplace transaction like a litigation finance 
investment.112 Contracts are a frequent subject of the law and 
economics scholarship.113 And an efficiency-based model may be most 
likely to speak to critics of litigation finance. At least at the national 
level, the chief critic is the United States Chamber of Commerce’s 
Institute for Legal Reform, which otherwise touts the efficiency  
 
different lenses can even be utilized together to effectively evaluate legal institutions); Joseph 
Singer, Normative Frameworks for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 950–76 (2009) (discussing how 
various normative lenses can be useful to analyze legal rules). 
 110. Economics as a discipline is often seen as attempting to promote efficiency in the 
marketplace. See MICHAEL KATZ & HARVEY ROSEN, MICROECONOMICS 379–403 (3d ed. 1998) 
(discussing how promoting consumption, allocative, and production efficiency is the main goal of 
welfare economics); see also Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512–18 (1980) (detailing how economics conceptualizes and promotes 
efficiency). Law and economics scholarship is no different. See Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right 
Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 817 (1989) 
(describing the normative foundations of law and economics and its focus on efficiency as  
an evaluation tool). Of course, the primary factor of analysis is whether a specific legal rule  
promotes efficiency. 
 111. Pareto efficiency is the bedrock of economics scholarship. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1960) (discussing the reciprocal nature of harm 
inherent to many social problems). Pareto efficiency occurs when “allocations of commodities and 
inputs [exist] such that the only way to make one individual better off is to make another worse 
off.” KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 110, at 380. This concept is closely related to allocative efficiency, 
where property is allocated such that one could not reallocate it without making somebody worse 
off. See id. at 557; see also Richard Markovits, Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of 
Allocative Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811 (1979) (applying Posner’s allocative efficiency to 
various legal institutional rules). We also note that there are other forms of efficiency that 
economics appeal to, including Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See infra note 119 for a more extended 
discussion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Future work can and should apply other forms of efficiency 
to litigation finance using our unified framework. 
 112. Most work in finance journals uses a law and economics lens to evaluate various policy 
changes. See, e.g., Eugene Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 
49 J. FIN. ECON. 283 (1998) (discussing how financial decisions and stock returns relate to 
efficiency); Stephen Rhoades, Efficiency Effects of Horizontal (In-Market) Bank Mergers, 17 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 411 (1993) (testing whether banks that do horizonal mergers achieve efficiency 
improvements relative to other firms); Joseph Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 
1141 (1976) (testing the strong efficient market hypothesis using trades made by insiders); James 
Dow & Gary Gorton, Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?, 52 
J. FIN. 1087 (1997) (modeling the relationship between the allocation efficiency of the marketplace 
and secondary stock market prices).  
 113. See supra note 108 (describing law and economics analyses of contract law).  
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of market solutions, rather than government regulations, for  
economic problems.114 
Although we focus on contract actions through a law and 
economics lens, we expect that our insights will apply to other causes of 
action and normative value structures, as we discuss in Part III. 
A. Pre-Claim Effects 
Litigation finance will likely affect at least three “pre-claim” 
categories of contracting behavior: the likelihood that a party will 
breach its contract, the likelihood that parties will contract in the first 
place, and the design and price of the parties’ contract. The precise 
impact that financing may have on these decisions will vary depending 
on the parties’ liquidity constraints, risk constraints, bargaining power, 
and other characteristics. But, by identifying these effects and shifting 
the discussion of litigation finance to earlier in the contracting phase, 
we hope this Section provides a road map for economists and empiricists 
to document how and to what extent litigation finance affects parties’ 
behaviors before a legal claim accrues. 
Our arguments proceed from the insight that litigation finance 
operates as what we call an “enforcement mechanism,” making it more 
likely that a party can successfully enforce its legal rights. Litigation 
finance does this in two ways. First, it makes it more likely that 
liquidity- or risk-constrained litigants will be able to sue to enforce their 
rights. Second, litigation finance allows litigants to better enforce their 
rights by providing them the resources to hire more qualified counsel, 
pursue a more robust litigation strategy, and resist financial pressure 
to settle for less than the full value of their claim. 
1. Fewer Inefficient Breaches 
Our first hypothesis is that litigation finance will affect the rate 
at which parties breach their contracts.115 Sophisticated corporate 
 
 114. For example, although the Chamber of Commerce and its Institute for Legal Reform 
advocate increased regulation of the litigation finance market, they otherwise support the 
deregulation of other financial markets. See Financial Regulation, U.S. CHAMBER COM., 
https://www.uschamber.com/financial-regulation (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
5PGP-GYW2] (“Excessive and unnecessary banking and securities regulations constrain access to 
capital for businesses, making it harder for them to form and grow. The Chamber believes a free 
and efficient capital market system is essential to economic growth and innovation.”). 
 115. A few scholars have briefly noted in passing that litigation funding may deter 
wrongdoing, but they have not elaborated on how and why deterrence might occur, nor have they 
discussed how funding may affect the incidence of efficient or inefficient breaches. See, e.g., David 
Tyler Adams, Note, Laissez Fair: The Case for Alternative Litigation Funding and Assignment of 
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entities usually breach contracts for economically rational reasons, 
when the expected benefits of breach exceed the costs.116 Even more, 
some have claimed that contracts are simply promises to pay 
expectation damages117 and that it is sometimes preferable for a party 
to breach rather than follow its contract.118 These welfare-maximizing 
breaches are called “efficient breaches.”119 An efficient breach is one 
where the total costs of a party abiding by its contract exceed the costs 
of that party breaching the contract, paying damages, and engaging in 
another more efficient economic transaction.120 These are breaches that 
 
Lawsuit Proceeds in Georgia, 49 GA. L. REV. 1121, 1154–57 (2015) (briefly discussing deterrent 
effects); Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 21, at 235 (“The monopsony breakup also causes 
future defendants to more accurately internalize the costs of their conduct and therefore to take 
due care, as they know they will not be able to discharge their liability easily by settling cheaply.”); 
Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 115 (suggesting that the presence of financing might better achieve a 
substantive law’s prescribed level of deterrence); Hylton, supra note 21, at 709–10 (suggesting that 
litigation finance might have limited deterrent effect over time). 
 116. The reasons why the benefits of breach may exceed the costs are varied, including that 
the contract is no longer financially viable or the promisor has access to more attractive uses for 
its finite resources. 
 117. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty 
to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not 
keep it,––and nothing else.”). But see Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on 
Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2000) (arguing that 
Holmes meant that a contractual breach is a legal wrong in the same way a tort is a legal wrong). 
 118. The moral weight we attach to the decision to breach might vary. Some scholars argue 
that contracts are promises that parties have a moral obligation to uphold. See, e.g., CHARLES 
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1 (1981) (“The promise 
principle, . . . the moral basis of contract law, is that principle by which persons may impose on 
themselves obligations where none existed before.”). Other scholars, principally from the law and 
economics school, argue that the decision whether to breach a contract has no moral weight. See, 
e.g., Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1349–50 
(2009) (“[C]oncepts of fault or blame . . . are not useful addenda to the doctrines of contract law.”). 
Of course, even law and economics scholars argue that the decision to breach and not pay the 
damages owed would be wrong. Id. at 1350 (“As long as you pay the damages awarded by the court 
in the promisee’s suit for breach of contract . . . no blame can attach to your not performing even 
if it was deliberate . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 119. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just 
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 
77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977) (popularizing the term “efficient breach”); see also Coase, supra note 
111, at 27 (“What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than 
the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the 
harm.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 89–90 (2d ed. 1977) (analyzing 
examples of efficient breaches and the incentives to which they respond).  
 120. See Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies—Efficiency, Equity, and the 
Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 114 (1981) (“[E]fficiency theory suggests that 
promisors who breach increase society’s welfare if their benefit exceeds the losses of their 
promisees.”); see also Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 953–69 (1982) (arguing that the concept of the simple efficient breach damage theory, 
although well-situated in law and economics, is a fallacy with respect to specific performance).  
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many legal practitioners (and certainly economists) would actually 
encourage.121 
One important issue, however, often goes unacknowledged in 
discussions of efficient breach: the efficient breach theory presumes 
that a party breaches and pays damages.122 Thus a theoretical model of 
expectation damages assumes that the probability of paying damages 
for a breach is 1. In the real world, this assumption does not hold.123 
When a promisor breaches her contract, she typically does not mail the 
promisee a check for expectation damages plus interest.  
Indeed, it may be economically irrational for the promisor to 
immediately pay damages, because there are many reasons she is 
unlikely to pay the full amount of damages she caused the promisee. 
 
 121. Many law and economic scholars view contractual relationships as ways to increase the 
efficiency of the marketplace. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The 
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 241 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, 
Transaction-Cost Economics] (articulating that contracting is a way to decrease cost for both 
parties and hence increase efficiency in the marketplace); Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the 
Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 171, 189–91 (2002) 
[hereinafter Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure] (expanding the concept 
of the firm boundaries as simply a question of contracting efficiency). Diving deeper into the 
“efficient” aspect of efficient breach, one can tie the theory to Pareto efficiency. Pareto efficiency 
holds that an efficient reallocation of resources exists if a party can be made better off without 
making a party worse off. This is the exact sort of efficiency that an efficient breach seeks to attain. 
Compare this to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which is less restrictive and exists when a winning party 
can compensate a losing party such that after compensation there would be Pareto efficiency. But 
it does not require actual compensation, only the possibility of it. For a more detailed discussion 
of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and contractual breaches, see Frank Menetrez, Consequentialism, 
Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 47 UCLA L. REV. 859, 859–82 (2000) 
(examining the theory of efficient breach from the perspective of moral philosophy). Of course, this 
view of efficiency in contractual breaches is skeptically viewed by moral philosophers who argue 
that contracts are moral promises which cannot be defended on simple economic principles. 
Rather, breaching a contract is a moral decision and entails morally problematic behavior. For a 
discussion of contracts as moral promises, see FRIED, supra note 118, at 7–16, and Seana Shiffrin, 
The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 729–48 (2007) (arguing that 
current treatment of contract law has abandoned the viewpoint that contracts are moral promises).  
 122. See Holmes, supra note 117, at 462 (describing contractual duty as a “prediction,” for 
which compensatory damages are the agreed-on contingency); Posner, supra note 118, at 1349–50 
(explaining how Holmes characterized a contract as an “option” between performance and paying 
damages); see also, e.g., Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
777, 777 (2012) (defining an efficient breach as “the idea that a contracting party should be 
encouraged to breach a contract and pay damages if doing so would be more efficient than 
performance”). 
 123. This is only one assumption of efficient breach theory that often does not hold empirically. 
Some have argued that still other assumptions necessary for efficient breach theory do not readily 
hold empirically. Macneil, supra note 120, argues that efficient breach theory assumes that the 
only way for the efficient set of conditions to arise is for a breaching party to not honor its contract. 
Id. at 950–53. In reality, however, there are other ways in which the conditions created by an 
efficient breach can be replicated without a contractual breach. See infra page 595 and 
accompanying model to see why probability equaling 1 is necessary for efficient breach. See also 
Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006) (arguing 
that efficiency in contractual settings need not rely on efficient breach, but rather moral 
conceptions of contracting can also fit in the framework of market efficiency).  
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The breach may go undetected, for example if the promisor secretly 
misappropriated the promisee’s trade secrets. Even if the breach is 
detected, the promisee may not challenge the breach, perhaps because 
her liquidity or risk constraints are so severe that she cannot or will not 
sue, or perhaps because her expected litigation costs exceed the 
damages amount, making dispute resolution inefficient. Even if the 
promisee seeks legal relief, dispute resolution is often quite costly, and 
its outcomes are fallible.124 The promisee’s liquidity or risk constraints 
may prevent her from hiring the highly skilled counsel she needs to win, 
or her constraints might force her to settle for less than the full value 
of her claim. Even if she litigates through trial, the judge or jury  
may find that no breach occurred or award less than the full amount  
of damages. 
If the probability of paying damages does not equal 1, then 
breaches will not be efficient, ceteris paribus. This is because people will 
breach their contracts when their expected benefits exceed their 
expected costs, and the expected cost is some discounted value of the 
actual cost that the promisor imposes on the defendant (and on society). 
A model illustrates the point. Take the following decision of 




Where P(By1	=	1) is the probability that the promisor "y1# will engage 
in a generic breach, and P(Ny1	> Cy1) is the probability that the benefits 
of breaching (Ny1) will be greater than the costs of breaching (Cy1). 
These costs are best thought of as the actual damages that y1 expects it 
will have to pay in the event of a breach. We can then model an “efficient 
breach” as the following:  
 
 
 124. See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 120, at 968–69 (“ ‘[T]alking after a breach’ may be one of the 
more expensive forms of conversation to be found, involving, as it so often does, engaging high 
priced lawyers, and gambits like starting litigation, engaging in discovery, and even trying and 
appealing cases.”); Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Immorality and Inefficiency of an Efficient Breach, 8 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 61, 89 (2006) (highlighting the transaction costs associated with 
contract breaches, including “the expenses incurred by both parties in resolving their dispute 
through negotiation, arbitration, or litigation”). 
 125. For simplicity’s sake, we assume that the only costs are those borne by the nonbreaching 
party, though we acknowledge that there are other social costs and externalities that are 
sometimes included in contractual breach calculations. We use a simple model here with no 
external social costs to make the intuition clear. Our analysis does hold as we make the decision 
to breach a contract more complex and realistic. 
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P(B*=	1)	= P(Ny1	> Cy2) 126 
 
Where P(B*=	1) is the probability that any given generic breach will be 
an efficient breach, and P(Ny1	> Cy2) is the probability that Ny1 will be 
greater than the total costs to the promisee (y2) of y1’s breach (Cy2). This 
is the most basic form of efficient breach, where the promisor must pay 
damages equal to expectation damages (e.g., the damages that the 
promisee suffers as a result of the breach).  
Further, we can express the relationship between the damages 




Where α	is a discount factor equaling the probability that y1 will 
actually pay the expectation damages of y2. We can therefore express 
when a generic breach will be an efficient breach: 
 
if a = 1 then P(By1) = P(B*) iff Cy1= Cy2 
 
A generic breach becomes an efficient breach if and only if the 
damages paid by the promisor are equal to the actual damages suffered 
by the promisee. In effect, a breach is only efficient when the promisor 
pays expectation damages, either due to court compulsion, moral 
suasion, or some other factor.127 
In the real world, α often does not equal 1. We have just noted 
many reasons why it may be that α < 1.128 For example, the promisee 
may not have the funding to sue, the promisee’s attorneys may not 
litigate the breach effectively, or a court may incorrectly calculate the 
promisee’s damages. Given the likelihood that each of those and other 
events may transpire to prevent the payment of full damages, α will 
almost always be less than 1. It follows: 
 
 
 126. Note that efficiency here is meant to capture Pareto efficiency rather than Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency. Pareto efficiency is often the underlying requirement to create an efficient breach. Note 
that a breach can be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, but not Pareto efficient, even if the breaching party 
does not pay full damages. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency only requires the possibility of payment, rather 
than actual payment. For further discussion of Pareto versus Kaldor-Hicks, see supra notes 112 
and 121. 
 127. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text (discussing efficient breach theory and 
how it presupposes that compensatory damages will be paid out of the “benefit” incurred).  
 128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing the high transaction costs of 
dispute resolution).  
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when α	<	1 then Cy1	<	Cy2 hence P(By1)	> P(B*)  
 
When α < 1, the probability of full expectation damages being 
paid decreases. This in turn decreases the expected damages that a 
promisor will have to pay. Therefore, the probability of a generic breach 
becomes higher than the probability of an efficient breach. In other 
words, most breaches are not going to be efficient under these 
conditions, and therefore, strictly economically speaking, most breaches 
should not take place. 
This is where litigation finance makes a difference. Litigation 
finance changes the discount rate because it increases the likelihood 
that the promisee will successfully challenge a breach. Funding makes 
the amount of damages that the breaching party expects to pay more 
closely approximate the amount of damages actually incurred by the 
nonbreaching party.129 Litigation finance does this because it operates 
as an enforcement mechanism, eroding some of the reasons the 
breaching party may not pay the full quantum of damages. Promisees 
that would otherwise not sue due to liquidity or risk constraints are now 
more likely to sue. Once the suit is commenced, promisees may be able 
to retain higher-quality counsel who is more likely to secure a judgment 
for the full value of the claim. And promisees are less likely to settle for 
less than that full value because litigation finance helps reduce or 
eliminate the liquidity or risk constraints that often lead parties to 
settle for a suboptimal amount. 
By increasing the discount rate, litigation finance forces 
promisors to more accurately consider the full costs of a breach. The 
greater the value ascribed to the cost of breach (Cy1), the more likely 
that value will exceed the benefits of breaching (Ny1). It follows that 
litigation finance will likely result in fewer instances in which the 
benefits of breaching exceed the costs, thus having a net deterrent effect 
against contract breaches. But litigation finance is unlikely to deter 
bona fide efficient breaches. The breaches that we identified would be 
deterred are inefficient breaches: instances where a promisor would not 
 
 129. Litigation finance thus puts less wealthy claimholders on a more level playing field with 
wealthier claimholders, whose wealth serves an in terrorem effect against contract breach. See 
Jeremy Kidd, Modeling the Likely Effects of Litigation Financing, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1239, 1256–
57 (2016): 
Wealthy individuals are less likely to become victims of wrongful behavior because a 
potential tortfeasor will take more care to avoid a victim that can afford a lawsuit. The 
poorer one is, therefore, the more likely it is that he will bear the cost of increased 
wrongful conduct. Consequently, those sectors that rely on individuals and businesses 
with lower incomes—as consumers or as workers—will also be negatively impacted. 
(footnote omitted). 
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have breached but for her assumption that she is unlikely to pay  
full damages to a counterparty. In short, funding should decrease  
the likelihood of inefficient breaches without deterring actual  
efficient breaches. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that litigation finance will, on 
balance, promote efficiency when it comes to the question of whether 
parties will breach contracts. At first blush, litigation finance should 
tend to discourage a class of inefficient breaches without disturbing the 
likelihood that parties will engage in an efficient breach. Litigation 
finance should therefore help change the nature of breaches so that  
they approach Pareto efficiency. When the nature of breaches 
approaches a more Pareto-efficient outcome, this promotes welfare in 
the marketplace. 
2. More Contracting 
Our second hypothesis is that litigation finance is likely to 
increase the incidence of contracting. A contract is an agreement 
between parties that the law will enforce.130 A promisee’s willingness to 
enter into a contract is thus a function of at least two factors: first, the 
promisee’s confidence that the promisor will adhere to its promise; and 
second, the promisee’s confidence that, if the promisor breaches, the 
promisee will obtain redress (usually, money damages or specific 
performance) for the breach.131 Litigation finance is likely to increase a 
promisee’s confidence on both scores and thus is likely on balance to 
increase the incidence of contracting. 
Our first point—that litigation finance will increase a party’s 
confidence that its counterparty will adhere to its promises—follows 
from what has just been discussed. Litigation finance deters a category 
of inefficient breaches, thereby giving promisees more confidence that 
the promisors will abide by their promise. Promisors tempted to breach 
their contract know that even if the promisee is liquidity or risk 
constrained, the promisee may obtain litigation finance to pursue  
the claim. 
This point may be situated within a broader understanding of 
counterparty risk. A contractual relationship is often a complicated and 
 
 130. See Wallace K. Lightsey, A Critique of the Promise Model of Contract, 26 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 45, 45 (1984) (examining theories of contract law). 
 131. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 366–67 
(2004) (detailing how risk aversion in the enforcement of promises affects a party’s likelihood of 
contracting in the first instance). 
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involved endeavor.132 Counterparty risk is one uncertain variable that 
can affect the decision of whether to contract with a party in the first 
place. In just about all contractual relationships, parties depend on 
their counterparty to perform in good faith. Therefore, potential parties 
to a contract will want to understand their counterparty as much  
as possible. 
Uncertainties frequently exist concerning who the counterparty 
is, how it operates, and, most importantly, whether it will honor its 
contract. For example, it is riskier to contract with a new counterparty 
than with a long-standing partner.133 The lower the contractual risk one 
perceives with the counterparty, the less risky the contractual 
relationship. Thus, for example, cultural norms and customs, 
particularly for transactions among members of the same tight-knit 
community, might provide some reassurance that a contract will be 
performed regardless of whether an impartial court system exists to 
enforce the contract.134 
If parties can decrease the uncertainty associated with 
counterparties, they will be more likely to enter into a contract in the 
 
 132. Many disciplines have weighed in on how contractual relationships come into existence, 
including law, philosophy, and business. See, e.g., SIMON DEAKIN & JOHNATHAN MICHIE, 
CONTRACTS, CO-OPERATION, AND COMPETITION: STUDIES IN ECONOMICS, MANAGEMENT, AND LAW 
(1997) (arguing for a balancing of cooperation and self-interested competition in private and public 
sector contracting); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 
288, 289 (1980) (arguing that the firm is essentially a set of contracts); KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 
110, at 379–88 (creating a game theoretic model for contractual negotiations); Jeffery M. Lipshaw, 
Contingency and Contracts: A Philosophy of Complex Business Transactions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1077 (2005) (drawing on pragmatist theory to explain the need to deal with contingency in 
commercial transactions); Eric Rasmusen, Agency Law and Contract Formation, 6 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 369 (2004) (detailing the efficiency of agents making contracts with third parties on behalf of 
a principle).  
 133. For one, repeat players garner trust and cooperation in contracting. See Kenneth S. Corts 
& Jasjit Singh, The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore 
Drilling, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 230, 232 (2004) (empirically showing that repeated interactions are 
often substitutes for high-powered formal contracts); Armin Falk, Simon Gächter & Judit Kovács, 
Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives in a Repeated Game with Incomplete Contracts, 20 J. 
ECON. PSYCH. 251, 273–275 (1999) (showing that counterparty effort increases over repeated 
exposures in the context of incomplete contracts); Bruce Lyons & Judith Mehta, Contracts, 
Opportunism and Trust: Self-Interest and Social Orientation, 21 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 239, 243–46 
(1997) (theorizing on two forms of trust that are created in contracting via repeated exchanges); 
Bart S. Vanneste & Phanish Puranam, Repeated Interactions and Contractual Detail: Identifying 
the Learning Effect, 21 ORG. SCI. 186, 198 (2010) (showing that organizations that  
interact repeatedly are better at writing more detailed contracts due to learning about  
their counterparties). 
 134. See Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement 
in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1573 (2006) (“Often because of ethnic, religious, or 
cultural ties, informal transacting norms arise and are enforced through informal, extra- 
legal sanctions.”). 
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first place.135 A simple example comes from the insurance world. 
Insurers face moral hazard and information asymmetry problems when 
presented with a request for insurance. When insurers price contracts, 
they need relevant risk information to efficiently write insurance 
contracts. But much of this needed information is often latent rather 
than observed. (Consider, for example, the middle-aged person who 
requests life insurance and may conceal a life-threatening ailment.) As 
such, insurance companies, and contracting parties at large, seek ways 
to lower this information asymmetry to decrease counterparty risk.136 
They often learn what they can about a counterparty—including their 
business models (or personal health), their financial incentives, and 
who they have worked with in the past—prior to contracting.137 
Litigation finance also decreases counterparty risk because 
litigation finance increases contractual compliance by deterring a class 
of inefficient breaches. Sophisticated parties following a game theoretic 
model would likely take this increase in compliance into account when 
deciding whether to contract.138 Knowing that the availability of 
litigation finance will make a counterparty less likely to breach 
decreases the risk that parties (especially those who are liquidity or risk 
 
 135. Various scholars identify counterparty risk as problematic. See Bruno Biais, Florian 
Heider & Marie Hoerova, Risk Sharing or Risk Taking? Counterparty Risk, Incentives, and 
Margins, 71 J. FIN. 1669 (2016) (showing that parties seek strategies that decrease counterparty 
risk); James R. Thompson, Counterparty Risk in Financial Contracts: Should the Insured Worry 
About the Insurer?, 125 Q.J. ECON. 1195 (2010) (arguing that the insured party in financial 
insurance contracts are exposed to excessive counterparty risk); Nicholas Vause, Counterparty 
Risk and Contract Volumes in the Credit Default Swap Market, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2010, at 59, 60 
(arguing that the decrease in credit default swap instances is due to the desire to decrease 
counterparty risk that was otherwise underestimated). 
 136. See, e.g., Eric W. Bond & Keith J. Crocker, Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting: The 
Endogenous Categorization of Risks in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information, 99 J. POL. 
ECON. 177 (1991) (arguing that insurance strategies of categorizing otherwise heterogeneous 
consumers into various risk buckets can help the market reach Nash equilibria); Alma Cohen, 
Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market, 87 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 197 (2005) (finding that asymmetric information in the insurance market exists 
and causes new customers to gain information advantages over issuers). But see James H. Cardon 
& Igal Hendel, Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical 
Expenditure Survey, 32 RAND J. ECON. 408 (2001) (arguing that there is lack of evidence that the 
insurance market contains asymmetries with respect to risk profiles).  
 137. Ali Fatemi & Iraj Fooladi, Credit Risk Management: A Survey of Practices, 32 
MANAGERIAL FIN. 227 (2006) (surveying the ways in which financial institutions manage 
counterparty risk); David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract 
Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 408–18 (2013) (empirically showing that parties engage in 
precautions before contracting and the precautions they take rely in part on the psychological 
frame in which they enter into negotiations).  
 138. For discussions of how parties use game theoretic intuition in negotiating contracts, see 
KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 110, at 379–88; and Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing 
Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1644–45 (2003). 
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constrained) bear by entering into a contract (especially where the 
counterparty faces fewer liquidity or risk constraints).139 
We turn now to the second reason litigation finance is likely to 
increase contracting: parties will have increased confidence that if their 
counterparty breaches the contract, they will be able to enforce that 
promise in court. To see this point, it is helpful to review the role of 
access to the courts in a contract system. There is widespread 
agreement among commentators that a system of impartial courts to 
enforce agreements is an essential ingredient to a functioning system 
of contracts.140 Hobbes made this point, arguing that in the state of 
nature, contracts cannot be relied on because society lacks “some 
coercive Power” to enforce the contract.141 More recently, Douglass 
North has argued that “the inability of societies to develop effective, 
low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of  
both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the 
Third World.”142 
One need not accept the strongest version of North’s argument 
to agree that a stable legal system that will enforce contracts is an 
important ingredient to a flourishing commercial system. Of course, it 
is not enough that courts exist. For one, the courts must be impartial. 
If judges are regularly bribed, or grant favors to preferred litigants, or 
sit in cases where they have conflicts of interest, parties may be less 
likely to have faith that they will be able to enforce their contracts.143 
The courts must also be effective at interpreting the parties’ intent. The 
application of established rules of contract interpretation and settled 
 
 139. One might argue that this phenomenon will deter contracting by parties who are likely 
to breach their contracts, or that it might deter good-faith parties from contracting for fear of a 
strike suit if the contract’s purposes are not realized. From an efficiency standpoint, deterring 
contracting by parties who plan to commit inefficient breaches is not a bad thing. And while it is 
possible that some parties may be deterred from entering into contracts for fear of a strike suit, 
the magnitude of this effect is likely to be quite small, particularly since courts should be expected 
to weed out most meritless claims. 
 140. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 54 (1990) (noting that the level of imperfection in enforcement mechanisms affects 
the transaction costs of the exchange); Trebilcock & Leng, supra note 134, at 1522 (explaining 
Douglass North’s position that third-party enforcement of contracts is essential). 
 141. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 97 (A.R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651). 
 142. NORTH, supra note 140, at 54. 
 143. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009) (“The citizen’s respect 
for judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court’s absolute probity. Judicial integrity is, in 
consequence, a state interest of the highest order.” (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 
536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
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precedents is generally regarded as improving commercial parties’ faith 
in their contracts.144 
A party’s ability to access the courts is also key, which is why 
North emphasized that it was not enough that courts exist, but that 
these courts must provide a “low-cost” enforcement mechanism. The 
most stable court system with the most impartial judges is useless to a 
litigant who cannot afford access to those courts. Litigation finance 
increases the likelihood that a party will be able to enforce its contract 
by suing over a breach.  
In this way, litigation finance plays a similar role in our legal 
system as do norms against oppressively high court filing fees, 
prohibitions on judges presiding over cases where they have a conflict 
of interest, and stable bodies of precedent about how contracts are 
interpreted. Each in its own way contributes towards the creation of a 
legal system where parties that enter into contracts can have confidence 
that their agreements will be enforced. 
If we are correct that litigation finance increases the likelihood 
that parties will contract, this should be a Pareto-improving 
development.145 Contracting allows parties to allocate risk to third 
parties that can best withstand that risk. If a firm can itself do very 
easily what it is contracting out, then it would be in the best interest of 
the firm to not contract. This is the standard way economists have 
viewed contracting. That is, parties will “outsource,” via a contractual 
relationship, those activities that they do not want to engage in within 
the firm.146 If they can make themselves better off by outsourcing 
 
 144. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the 
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 652–53 (1999) (discussing precedent’s role in “assuring 
stability in commercial relationships,” and arguing that “[i]n some cases, contracts or title to 
property may be premised on a rule established by case law; overruling such precedent would 
undermine vested contract and property rights”); see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 
U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in 
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be  
settled right.”). 
 145. For a discussion of the Pareto-efficient frontier, see KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 110, at 
386–94. Pareto-improving moves, by definition, shift distribution among parties towards a Pareto-
efficient frontier (where there can be no Pareto-improving moves). Allocations, however, can be 
changed such that even though a party is made worse off, the equilibrium still gets closer to the 
Pareto-efficient point, so such moves still help drive towards efficient outcomes. 
 146. The classic argument for why and how firms decide between engaging in contracts is 
detailed by Oliver Williamson. See Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 121, at 
240 (arguing that firms seek to engage in contract relationships when they recognize that it is 
cheaper and more cost effective to outsource an activity rather than perform that activity in-house, 
and providing that “ transaction-specific savings can accrue at the interface between supplier and 
buyer as contracts” adapt to unfolding events and are periodically renewed). See also Williamson, 
The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure, supra note 121 (analyzing the existence of 
organization structures via a contractual relationship approach).  
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activity to another firm via a contract, then, all else held constant,  
they will.147 
Therefore, if litigation finance promotes contracting by 
increasing the incidence of contractual relationships, it allows firms to 
engage in a type of behavior that makes them better off. And 
contracting presents both counterparties with these same 
opportunities. Thus, when two parties engage in a contract, they are 
creating Pareto-improving moves because both recognize that they 
would be worse off had they not agreed to outsource the respective 
activities to their counterparty.148 Litigation finance then makes all 
parties better off (by promoting Pareto efficiency) when it increases the 
likelihood that parties will contract. 
3. Contract Price and Design 
Our third hypothesis is that litigation finance will affect the 
result of the contractual bargaining process, including the contract’s 
price and nonprice terms. There is disagreement in the literature about 
how bargaining power affects “contract design,” or the nonprice terms 
of a contract.149 The law and economics literature generally adopts what 
has been called the “irrelevance theory” of bargaining power, which 
posits that bargaining power affects price terms but not nonprice 
terms.150 On this view, the parties will adopt whatever nonprice terms 
maximize total efficiency, with the parties then dividing up that 
efficiency through the contract’s price according to each party’s 
bargaining power. If, for example, Party A derives more value from 
litigating in her home state than Party B would derive from litigating 
in his home state, the parties will choose a forum selection clause with 
Party A’s home state, even if Party B has more bargaining power, with 
 
 147. See Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 121, at 250–53 (explaining 
relational contracting, including bilateral and unified structures). 
 148. Williamson’s framework for determining whether contracting will take place is 
inexorably tied to changes in distributions that move closer to Pareto efficiency. See, e.g., Yeon-
Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, 89 AM. ECON. 
REV. 125 (1999) (acknowledging that contracting creates more efficient outcomes but only under 
certain conditions); Steinar Holden, Renegotiation and the Efficiency of Investments, 30 RAND J. 
ECON. 106 (1999) (showing that even breaches of contractual relationships can lead to efficient 
outcomes via renegotiation); Schwartz & Watson, supra note 108 (discussing the impact of costly 
contract negotiation on efficiency). 
 149. For a helpful summary of this debate, see Spencer Williams, Venture Capital Contract 
Design: An Empirical Analysis of the Connection Between Bargaining Power and Venture 
Financing Contract Terms, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 105, 106–23 (2017). 
 150. Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 
VA. L. REV. 1665, 1678–80 (2012); Williams, supra note 149, at 110–13. 
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Party B extracting value through a more favorable contract price.151 The 
“direct effect theory,” by contrast, argues that bargaining power will 
affect nonprice as well as price terms, such that this contract  
would select Party B’s home state because Party B had greater 
bargaining power. 152 
Our goal here is not to advocate that one theory of bargaining is 
correct, but rather to illustrate how litigation finance may affect the 
bargaining over nonprice terms. Our analysis assumes the irrelevance 
theory. We do not purport to identify the full range of effects that 
litigation finance may have on the price and nonprice terms of a 
contract, but only to identify that an effect will occur and to briefly 
identify through an example how that effect might occur. 
Litigation finance may alter the parties’ preferences for certain 
nonprice terms. For example, the presence of financing may affect the 
value that parties place on dispute-resolution provisions of a contract, 
such as arbitration clauses, choice of law and venue provisions, and 
limitation-of-liability provisions. Litigation finance may also affect the 
value parties place on the contractual provisions that are most likely to 
be the subject of litigation, such as the language permitting one party 
to use another’s trade secrets or the language describing the reasonable 
efforts that each party to a joint venture must make in pursuing the 
joint venture’s ends. 
Consider the example of a proposed contractual provision that 
would prohibit any party from recovering consequential damages. 
Assume promisee, P, is significantly liquidity or risk constrained and 
thus unlikely, without third-party financing, to mount a successful 
breach of contract claim if promisor, D,  breaches. Moreover, assume D 
should have little difficulty litigating a contract action as either the 
plaintiff or defendant and that D is more likely to be the breaching party 
(perhaps because only P is sharing its trade secrets). 
In a world without litigation finance, P may only be willing to 
pay $10 for a contract that has no liability cap, since P is unlikely to 
obtain significant damages even if D breaches. D might have incomplete 
but partial knowledge of P’s liquidity or risk constraints, so it may be 
willing to pay $20 for a contract with a limitation of liability provision. 
In this scenario, we would expect the contract to contain the limitation 
 
 151. See Williams, supra note 149, at 112 (discussing a similar hypothetical negotiation of an 
arbitration location in the sale of a used car). 
 152. Choi & Triantis, supra note 150 at 1669; Williams, supra note 149, at 113–17. 
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of liability provision, for a price change in P’s favor, the amount 
depending on the parties’ relative bargaining power.153 
In a world where P may obtain litigation finance for at least 
some breaches by D, the parties might value this provision differently. 
For example, P might place increased value on having no liability cap 
so that it might recover the full quantum of its damages. Meanwhile, D 
might also place greater value on the limitation of liability provision, 
given that P is more likely to enforce the contract. In this world, P may 
be willing to pay $40 for a contract that does not contain a limitation of 
liability, and D may be willing to pay $30 for a contract that does. In 
this scenario, under the irrelevance theory, we would expect the 
contract to not contain the limitation of liability provision, for a price 
change in D’s favor.154 
In addition to affecting contract design, litigation finance may 
also affect the parties’ bargaining power. Bargaining power is typically 
understood as a function of a party’s “best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement,” or “BATNA.”155 Albert Choi and George Triantis have 
argued that a party’s BATNA is usually a function of five factors, 
including demand and supply conditions, market concentration,  
private information, patience and risk aversion, and negotiating skills  
and strategy.156 
Litigation finance may affect several of these levers, perhaps 
most significantly demand and supply conditions. We argued earlier 
that litigation finance is likely to increase the incidence of contracting 
by making a party more likely to contract with a wider range of 
counterparties, including with less liquidity- or risk-constrained 
counterparties and with counterparties that may seem more likely to 
breach a contract.157 Assuming competitive conditions exist, a party 
may, for example, be willing to enter into a supply contract with a wider 
range of potential suppliers. This would on balance introduce greater 
competition into the contract market, giving the party with access to 
financing greater bargaining power in any given transaction. 
 
 153. See Williams, supra note 149, at 112 (explaining in the context of a similar hypothetical 
that although a certain contract term may have a distributional effect, “the relative bargaining 
power of the parties does not affect its optimal form”). 
 154. See id. at 111 (positing that under irrelevance theory, parties will use the most efficient 
contract design to extract the highest value). 
 155. See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 97–105 (Penguin Books 2d ed. 1991) (1981) (“[T]he relative 
negotiating power of two parties depends primarily upon how attractive to each is the option of 
not reaching agreement.”). 
 156. Choi & Triantis, supra note 150, at 1675. 
 157. See supra Section II.A.2 (reasoning that litigation finance would increase the promisee’s 
confidence that the promisor will adhere to its promise and that if the promisor breaches its 
promise, the promisee will obtain redress for the breach). 
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At first blush, our analysis might not lead to obvious efficiency 
gains; it may just change the price and nonprice terms of a contract. 
But the terms in a world with litigation finance are more likely to 
approximate the most efficient terms. Recall that the negotiation that 
happens in a world without litigation finance is a world where 
contracting parties (and the weaker contracting party in particular) 
cannot access capital markets to efficiently allocate the cost and risk of 
bringing litigation. Litigation finance allows for the efficient contract 
price and nonprice terms in a world where both parties have relatively 
unimpeded access to the capital markets, and thus will tend to provide 
a more efficient set of contract terms. 
B. Post-Claim Effects 
Now that we have identified several pre-claim effects of 
litigation finance, we turn to the topic that has received scholarly 
attention: litigation finance’s post-claim effects. Our objective here is 
not to comprehensively review the existing scholarship on litigation 
finance. Instead, our goal is to identify the most important post-claim 
effects that should be considered as part of any effort to understand 
litigation finance’s total welfare impact and to briefly identify how those 
effects should be evaluated through a law and economics lens. 
1. Whether and Which Legal Claims Are Brought 
For many observers of litigation finance, it is almost a truism 
that financing will result in an increase in the amount of litigation.158 
Paul Rubin argues that an increase in litigation is an “obvious effect of 
increased third-party financing.”159 Maya Steinitz claims that “[t]he 
primary import of the industry is its propensity to increase the number 
of cases brought.”160 “The broad assumption,” Jeremy Kidd asserts, “is 
that there will be an increase in the volume of cases brought; 
proponents and opponents disagree only on whether those cases will be 
meritorious or frivolous.”161 Kidd’s own analysis concludes that 
 
 158. For an exception to this line of thinking, see Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 953 
(“The ultimate effect of third-party litigation financing on total litigation costs is quite complex 
and an empirical question that we do not endeavor to resolve. We merely note that it is anything 
but clear that litigation finance net increases litigation costs.”). 
 159. Rubin, supra note 10, at 677. 
 160. Steinitz, supra note 6, at 1084. 
 161. Kidd, supra note 129, at 1241. 
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“[i]ncreased money to finance litigation should guarantee some increase 
in litigation,” though he has questioned the magnitude of that impact.162 
It is tempting to assume that litigation finance will result in 
more litigation. After all, both funding’s opponents and supporters 
emphasize its ability to allow claimholders to bring claims that they 
would otherwise abandon without access to third-party financing.163 
But there are reasons to doubt financing will result in much, if any, net 
increase in litigation. 
First, and most importantly, predictions that litigation finance 
will result in an increase in litigation suffer from the same limitation 
we addressed earlier in this Article, namely that they look only to 
financing’s post-claim effects. We have suggested that, at least in the 
context of business contracts, litigation finance will likely (a) decrease 
the number of contract breaches, (b) increase the number of contracts 
entered into, and (c) affect contract price and design.164 A decrease in 
the number of contract breaches would suggest a decrease in the 
amount of litigation. An increase in the number of contracts could result 
in a net increase in litigation simply because there is more commercial 
activity that might go awry—which would lead to the result predicted 
by scholars (more litigation), but for a very different reason (more 
commercial activity, not necessarily a greater rate of litigated contract 
disputes). Finally, changes in contract price and design could have 
various effects on the likelihood of litigation, with some contract designs 
being more or less likely to promote litigation.165 For example, if 
litigation finance resulted in more contracts having arbitration 
provisions, in-court litigations might decline, though arbitrations might 
increase. Similarly, if litigation finance resulted in more contracts 
having limitation of liability provisions, fewer cases may be filed 
because the expected value of those cases with a limitation of liability 
provision would be too low. 
 
 162. Id. at 1258. One early empirical study of litigation financing’s impact in Australia has 
concluded that the rise of litigation finance was correlated with an increase in the number of 
lawsuits filed. David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at 
Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1106 (2013). 
 163. Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1338 (“Third-party financing of litigation will increase access 
to justice and encourage private enforcement of the law.”); de Morpurgo, supra note 26, at 381–82 
(identifying access to justice as a positive externality of litigation finance); see also Lawsuit 
Funding, LLC v. Lessoff, No. 650757/2012, 2013 WL 6409971, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 4, 2013) 
(“[L]itigation funding allows lawsuits to be decided on their merits, and not based on which party 
has deeper pockets or stronger appetite for protracted litigation.”). 
 164. See supra Section II.A (discussing the pre-claim effects of litigation financing). 
 165. Cf. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 
YALE L.J. 814, 818 (2005) (“The choice between precise terms and vague terms thus reduces to who 
chooses the relevant evidentiary proxies and when they are chosen: the parties at the time of 
contracting or the court at trial.”). 
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Second, there are good reasons to question how many cases 
would not be filed but for the presence of litigation finance.166 At least 
in the commercial litigation finance market, only a small minority of 
cases are “investment grade” for litigation financiers.167 Commercial 
litigation financiers reject the vast majority (even ninety percent or 
more) of financing requests that they receive.168 And many, if not most, 
of the cases that receive financing would likely be litigated by a law firm 
on a full contingency fee but for the presence of litigation finance.169 
Third, balanced against funding’s tendency to allow litigants to 
bring some claims they would not otherwise bring, litigation finance is 
also likely to prevent at least some claims from being filed. Scholars 
have noted that litigation finance may act as a signaling mechanism, 
indicating to courts and defendants which claims have merit and which 
do not.170 A signal can be sent to prospective litigants too. If a 
claimholder and law firm seek financing but are unable to secure 
funding, they may view this as a signal about the merits of the case and 
decline to self-finance the matter. 
Perhaps the most important point from a law and economics 
perspective is that the mere fact that more or fewer cases are filed tells 
us little about whether litigation finance has a net positive or negative 
impact on welfare. Like Goldilocks, we need to understand whether the 
pre-funding world has too little, too much, or just enough litigation. If 
litigation finance leads to a net increase in suits that are filed, this may 
 
 166. For example, Jeremy Kidd has suggested that litigation finance may only make a 
difference in whether a case is brought when the plaintiff is so liquidity constrained that it cannot 
afford to litigate or where cases are brought for strategic goals. Kidd, supra note 129, at 1241; see 
also Sebok, supra note 48, at 112 (“[Litigation financing] may not have any effect on the outcome 
of the litigation (either because it is not directly or indirectly being used to fund litigation-related 
expenses or because there were other resources at hand that would have been used had the funding 
not existed).”). 
 167. Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 936.  
 168. See, e.g., BURFORD CAPITAL, supra note 40, at 17 (stating that in 2018 and 2019, Burford 
invested in 5.9% and 7%, respectively, of inbound requests for funding). An empirical study of one 
consumer litigation funder found that the funder invested in fifty percent of matters where funding 
was requested, which suggests very different selection criteria between commercial and consumer 
litigation funders. Avraham & Sebok, supra note 44, at 1145. 
 169. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 679–80 (arguing that sufficient incentives already exist for 
claimholders to bring meritorious litigation). Of course, this does not mean that a litigant is 
agnostic as to working with a contingency fee lawyer rather than a funder, particularly in light of 
a funder’s ability to monetize a claim. And this does not mean litigation finance has no effect on 
our legal system. As we will discuss below, funding may have a great impact on how claims are 
litigated and resolved, even if it has a lesser impact on whether cases are brought. See infra Section 
II.B.2 (reasoning that litigation financing can ease financial pressure on cash-strapped or risk-
averse litigants who might otherwise settle for less than the full value of their claims). 
 170. Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 21, at 249–50, 256. 
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be because the previous level of financing was suboptimal due to the 
exclusion of too many liquidity- or risk-constrained plaintiffs.171 
Some commentators argue that litigation finance will result in 
an increase in the amount of frivolous litigation, particularly cases that 
are unlikely to succeed but would present a large payout if they do 
succeed.172 Supporters of litigation finance respond that financiers 
invest only in the strongest claims, and those who back frivolous cases 
will not remain in business for long.173 Moreover, this critique of 
funding is probably especially weak in the context of breach of contract 
cases, where punitive damages generally are unavailable, limiting the 
financial upside compared to, say, billion-dollar class actions. Finally, 
to the extent a contract action (or any other action, including a class 
action) does present outsized awards, it is likely that the case will be 
brought regardless of the existence of litigation funding by a lawyer 
willing to take the case on a full contingency. 
While the net welfare impact of litigation finance on which 
claims are brought is difficult to predict, litigation finance is likely to 
improve efficiency. We should expect litigation finance to result in the 
pursuit of more claims with an expected positive value, though 
financing will also affect how many such claims exist through a variety 
of mechanisms, including by increasing contracting, deterring breach, 
and providing the resources to nudge some cases from having a negative 
expected value to a positive expected value. Of course, some underlying 
legal regimes promote inefficiency rather than efficiency, and allowing 
more litigation under these legal regimes may result in net 
 
 171. Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 121–22 (“[I]f financing leads to more litigation, it would seem 
to do so only because, as I explained, the financing disadvantages of plaintiffs have led them to file 
too few cases now. Thus, this is really not a cost of claim investing, but a benefit.”); Sebok, The 
Inauthentic Claim, supra note 21, at 68:  
Even if [litigation finance resulted in an increase of claims], why would this be a bad 
thing? If the malpractice claims that would be assigned were not fraudulent and 
reflected claims based on valid law, why would it be a bad thing for these cases to 
increase in number, since that would mean that more legal wrongs would be repaired 
and more wrongdoers held to account? 
 172. See, e.g., Beisner, Miller & Rubin, supra note 77, at 5–7; Rubin, supra note 10, at 675; 
Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 211 (arguing that litigation finance may promote frivolous litigation 
and suggesting a fee cap to limit incentives to invest in litigation where the plaintiff is unlikely  
to prevail). 
 173. Molot, supra note 9, at 106 (“Although opponents of third-party financing predict that 
such financing might encourage meritless filings rather than meritorious ones, the claim makes 
little sense.”); Anthony Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From Champerty to Insurance, 
60 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 453–55 (2011) (describing as “far-fetched” the “fear that a market in 
champerty will result in lawsuits that are more likely to be frivolous”); Victoria A. Shannon, 
Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 875 (2015) (“It 
is not in the funder’s interest to fund frivolous cases, because the funder would incur only costs 
without benefits when the case fails, and a court may sanction the funded party for bringing a 
frivolous case.”). 
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inefficiencies. But an objection to this effect is more precisely an 
objection to the underlying legal regime, not to litigation finance.174 
Assuming that our system of contract laws promotes rather than 
reduces efficiency, an increase in litigation over contract breaches may 
well increase efficiency. 
2. How Claims Are Litigated and Resolved 
Litigation finance may have a more profound effect on how 
claims are litigated and resolved, rather than on whether claims are 
brought. How financing may affect the resolution of legal claims has 
received significant attention from scholars. One seminal article 
contends that litigation finance eases financial pressure on cash-
strapped or risk-averse litigants to settle their claims for less than full 
value.175 Other scholars have tracked this analysis to conclude that 
litigation finance is likely to improve social welfare by expanding the 
market for settlements.176 Critics of this viewpoint counter that at least 
in some circumstances, litigants will push for inefficiently high case 
resolutions—perhaps rejecting reasonable settlement offers or 
proceeding to trial, inefficiently wasting resources—because the 
financing contract is structured to incentivize the claimholder to seek a 
“home run” rather than accept a reasonable settlement.177 
Litigation finance will affect how claims are litigated in a 
number of respects. First, litigation finance will allow claimholders to 
hire better counsel. One obvious way this will happen is that financiers 
provide additional capital to retain higher-quality counsel. But 
litigation finance also expands the universe of law firms that are able 
to litigate plaintiff-side matters. We previously explained that many 
large law firms are ill-equipped to litigate matters on a full contingency, 
but they are able to take on matters where a funder pays some or all of 
 
 174. Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 952 (“[T]hese potential objections instead focus on 
either the social benefits of the underlying rules of decision or the inefficiency of the civil justice 
system. These are serious and substantial problems, but neither of these problems has anything 
to do with third-party litigation financing.”). 
 175. Molot, supra note 9, at 101 (arguing that when third-party capital providers provide risk-
averse plaintiffs with a market alternative to settling with a defendant, plaintiffs “would be better 
able to hold out for higher settlements that are closer to the mean expected damages award”). 
 176. Avraham & Wicklegren, supra note 21, at 235; Glickman, supra note 30, at 1064 (arguing 
that litigation finance essentially removes one party’s competitive advantage of access to capital, 
and thus “level[s] the playing field by enabling companies with valid claims or defenses but few 
resources to obtain fair settlements”). 
 177. Rodak, supra note 41, at 513–24 (discussing funding’s effect on settlement incentives); 
see also Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 593, 600 (2012) (arguing that litigation funders are incentivized to finance cases 
that seek inefficiently large damages awards or settlements). 
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the firm’s legal fees.178 Many law firms that were unable to compete in 
the “full contingency” litigation market are now able to compete in the 
“partial contingency” market that litigation financiers help create. 
Litigation finance will also result in the allocation of additional 
resources to litigate cases. Claimholders who might previously have 
pursued their litigation on a shoestring can now afford higher-quality 
support services, including the full complement of experts they need to 
maximize their claim’s value. 
This does not necessarily mean that the amount of resources 
spent on litigation will increase. For example, while financiers may 
commit additional resources to litigation, meritorious cases may resolve 
more quickly (and without as much expense) than they might 
otherwise. As the plaintiff’s likelihood of success increases, the 
defendant’s willingness to settle should also increase. Indeed, Jef De 
Mot and Michael Fuare have argued that for the most meritorious 
cases, litigation finance may result in a net decrease in expenditures, 
because defendants are more likely to settle quickly.179 
As with the question of whether financing results in a net 
increase in cases filed, even if financing results in costlier litigation or 
higher settlement amounts, that tells us little about whether financing 
has a net positive or negative impact on social welfare.180 Settlement 
figures or legal expenditures might have been too low, at least for the 
cases that are likely to receive litigation finance. But at least to the 
extent that litigation finance results in settlement values that more 
accurately reflect the damage caused by the defendant to the plaintiff, 
we would expect for litigation finance to enhance net welfare. 
3. The Price of Legal Services 
Litigation finance is also likely to affect the price of legal 
services, that is, the amount of up-front cash and the percentage of case 
 
 178. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 179. Jef De Mot & Michael G. Faure, Third-Party Financing and Litigation Expenditures, 12 
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 751, 771 (2016) (explaining that litigation finance may decrease the amount 
spent on meritorious litigation because “when the plaintiff spends more, the case becomes even 
less close and it becomes less valuable for the defendant to spend more,” though also arguing that 
litigation finance may increase total expenditure on cases that are relatively weak); see also 
Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 954 (“[T]hird-party litigation financing has a complicated 
relationship with overall litigation levels: it causes some cases to exist that otherwise would not, 
and encourages some cases to settle that might otherwise go to trial.”). 
 180. Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 122 (acknowledging “the worry that claim investing will 
cause litigation to last longer, thereby consuming greater resources of the parties and the court 
system,” but arguing that “even if it is true, again, it would seem to do so only because a world 
without claim investing led parties to settle cases too quickly for lack of resources or lack of  
risk tolerance”). 
            
2021] THE SHADOWS OF LITIGATION FINANCE 611 
proceeds a claimholder must pay to secure the legal services necessary 
to bring her case. We previously noted some scholars’ suspicion that 
lawyers tend to charge supracompetitive contingency fee rates than 
they would be able to charge in a purely competitive market.181 
Litigation finance introduces further price competition in at least three 
ways. First, litigation financiers directly compete with lawyers for the 
right to “purchase” an entitlement to a portion of case proceeds in 
exchange for providing the capital to litigate a matter. Second, as noted, 
litigation financiers allow for more lawyers to enter the market for 
plaintiff-side litigation, introducing further price competition among 
lawyers. Third, litigation financiers are repeat players with an 
expertise in efficiently bringing litigation. Repeat players in any 
transaction often gain valuable experience that allows them to better 
and more easily navigate a similar subsequent transaction. We expect 
that these repeat players in the litigation context will have more 
experience and be better at navigating the litigation process, hence 
leading to a lower cost of litigating than a one-time plaintiff, allowing 
financiers to further drive down the cost of legal services.182 
The efficiency effects here are clear: price competition is 
generally a good thing that enhances social welfare. Litigation finance 
is likely to allow claimholders to pay fewer transaction costs to bring 
their suit, enhancing efficiency. Note that as the price of legal services 
decreases, this too will have secondary effects in the market: it may, for 
example, further increase the likelihood that parties will enforce 
breaches, in turn further decreasing the rate at which inefficient 
breaches will occur, though potentially also leading to an increase in 
the consumption of legal services as price falls. 
4. The Allocation of Risk 
Once a legal claim accrues, litigation finance will certainly affect 
who bears the legal risk. As we argued earlier, one of litigation finance’s 
two principal purposes is to help risk-constrained litigants share 
litigation risk.183 Litigation finance helps bring a crucial function of the 
capital markets to litigation: it allows the risk of a capital-intensive 
project (here, the pursuit of litigation) to be borne by the parties most 
 
 181. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the contingency fee issue). 
 182. Hylton, supra note 21, at 732 (“[T]o the extent third-party enforcers are more efficient 
litigators than are original victims, social welfare can be enhanced through a reduction in the 
resources devoted to litigation.”). 
 183. See supra Section I.B. 
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capable of bearing that risk.184 Consider the small business that 
manufacturers widgets for a Fortune 100 company. The small 
business’s shareholders and executives may have been happy to bear 
the business risks associated with a supply contract with a Fortune 100 
company, but once the contract is breached, other entities may be better 
situated to bear the financial costs and risks of the litigation.185 Part of 
the reason for this is that accurately pricing legal claims is hard, and so 
the financing of those claims may best be left to those with more 
expertise in that area.186 
Moreover, scholars have recognized that firms face an allocation 
problem in the face of a contract dispute. They have to decide how much 
money to allocate towards a lawsuit in a context where their funds are 
limited. As such, the decision of where to allocate money is an important 
one. All things being equal, firms would want to allocate money to the 
next best available resource until the return on any marginal dollar 
invested is zero. In other words, they would want to reach allocation 
efficiency, where the marginal cost of a project should equal its 
marginal revenue.187 
The lack of liquidity and the high cost of litigation makes this 
allocation decision difficult for firms facing budget constraints.188 
Litigation finance, however, helps firms effectively allocate resources to 
other areas of their business while not losing the opportunity to fund 
litigation.189 This increases the allocative efficiency of the company. The 
 
 184. Cf. Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 
68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1631–32 (2015) (“According to established economic theory, markets speak 
through prices. When traders transact rationally with one another, their interactions reveal what 
they know about a security and how much they wish to pay to buy or sell it based on their 
knowledge and risk preferences.”). 
 185. Hylton, supra note 21, at 733 (“The original victim may be risk-averse and the financier 
could spread risk across a portfolio of investments. When the victim sells his claim to the financier, 
social welfare is enhanced by the reallocation of risk from a risk-averse party to a risk- 
neutral party.”). 
 186. Molot, supra note 21, at 380–85; Maya Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the 
Window? Pricing Legal Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889, 1903–06 (2013). 
 187. This is the classic definition of allocation efficiency: “An allocation of goods such that the 
marginal rate of transformation between any two goods is equal to consumers’ common value of 
the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods.” KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 110, at 387. 
Of course, in the firm case, the goods are “projects,” including “litigation,” and the consumers  
are “firms.”  
 188. See Molot, supra note 21, at 370–71 (“The company may ask its lawyers at the outset how 
much the lawsuit will cost (in legal fees and payments to the plaintiff), but the lawyers will only 
be able to make predictions, and very likely there will be more than one trajectory that the lawsuit 
may follow.”).  
 189. See, e.g., id. at 105 (“Lawyers may be better suited . . . to identify pools of cases in need of 
risk transfers, to price those risk transfers, and to allocate litigation resources efficiently over the 
pool, but lawyers are not necessarily as well equipped to supply the requisite risk capital and bear 
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company is not specialized in litigation, and hence every dollar spent on 
litigation does not reap as much of a benefit as dollars spent on other 
projects where it has more specialized expertise. A litigation funder’s 
expertise is litigation, and hence it is a better party to allocate resources 
to the litigant’s dispute.190 Therefore, litigation finance produces a more 
efficient allocation of resources to financing litigation. 
In addition to allocation decisions, the decisions about when to 
sue, when to settle, when to go to trial, and so on are usually borne by 
claimants and their lawyers. These decisions are frequently wrought 
with behavioral biases and emotions.191 Having a third party weigh in 
on the decision whether to sue infuses a type of economic efficiency into 
the litigation process.192 This is because litigation financiers have large 
portfolios of lawsuits that they fund, and like those that invest in stock 
portfolios, financiers seek to maximize their return given the risk 
associated with litigation.193 In effect, litigation finance brings a type of 
rigorous economic cost-benefit decisionmaking to the legal market.194 
5. Effects on the Legal Profession 
The effects of litigation finance on the legal profession may be 
the most challenging issue to address from a law and economics 
 
all of the litigation risk.”); Molot, supra note 9, at 82–90 (arguing that litigation finance serves a 
risk allocation purpose that is necessary to counteract the skewing of settlements from their 
merits); Shepherd & Stone, supra note 21, at 945–48 (arguing that ultimately litigation finance 
allows companies and plaintiffs to allocate capital efficiently). 
 190. See De Mot & Faure, supra note 179, at 764–77 (detailing a formal model for how 
allocating money to litigation finance is more efficiently done by a financier than the party seeking 
to enforce its contractual right). 
 191. See Linda Babcock & Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral 
Approach, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 341, 367–70 (1999) (detailing a model that shows how biases affect 
settlement decisions in litigation); Donald Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and 
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1506–20 (1998) 
(providing a detailed survey of all the ways behavioral biases affect legal decisions); Brian 
Spangler, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: The Psychological Barriers to Economically Efficient Civil 
Settlement and a Case for Third-Party Mediation, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1435, 1441–46, 1463–65 (2012) 
(arguing that firms are not economically rational decisionmakers with respect to civil litigation 
settlements); Andrew Wistrich & Jeffrey Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 
86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 620–22 (2012) (arguing that there are several lawyer-driven, nonfinance, 
reasons that litigation can be prolonged).  
 192. Litigation funders may not, however, control litigation strategy or settlement decisions. 
That authority is reserved to the counsel and claimant. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (lawyer must “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation” and “[a] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter”); id. 
r. 2.1 (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and 
render candid advice.”). 
 193. See generally Molot, supra note 9, at 82–101. Molot argues that applying a more market-
driven mindset to litigation decisions would provide more efficient outcomes.  
 194. See Heaton, supra note 42, at 329–30 (demonstrating that litigation finance moves 
outcomes closer to ones that are risk neutral). 
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perspective. The legal ethics rules are often thought of as “moral” or 
“ethical” rules not susceptible to a law and economics analysis. Some 
scholars, however, have invited a law and economics analysis of the 
ethics rules, particularly to the extent the legal ethics rules are 
cynically viewed as protectionist measures by lawyers to insulate 
themselves from competition.195 
From a law and economics perspective, Jonathan Macey and 
Geoffrey Miller have argued that, as a general rule, “supply-reducing 
rules” are likely to be inefficient because “the welfare loss associated 
with the reduction in supply is greater than the welfare benefit that 
might be achieved by providing quality assurance.”196 Meanwhile, “cost-
reducing rules” are likely to be efficient “because the bar’s interest in 
reducing the cost of providing legal services aligns well with the public’s 
interest in efficient contracting.”197 They argue that “[e]fficient ethics 
rules are those that reduce contracting costs between lawyers and their 
clients by supplying reasonable terms to which lawyer and client would 
agree, in most cases, if they were to bargain over the issue.”198 
Many of the most contentious debates about litigation finance 
concern its impact on the legal profession.199 For example, there is 
controversy over whether Model Rule 5.4, which provides that a lawyer 
generally “shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer,”200 prohibits 
portfolio litigation finance agreements between funders and law firms 
(as opposed to deals between funders and claimholders, which do not 
implicate Rule 5.4).201 The Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal 
Reform has separately argued that litigation finance might impair a 
 
 195. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest 
Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965, 965–66 (1997) (arguing that treating the lawyer-client 
relationship like an agency contract will allow the bar to set regulations to achieve more efficient 
outcomes). 
 196. Id. at 966. 
 197. Id. at 966–67. 
 198. Id. at 967. 
 199. For discussions of the ethical issues presented by litigation finance, see the sources cited 
supra note 11. 
 200. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 201. A nonbinding 2018 opinion of the New York City Bar Association concluded that Rule 5.4 
of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (which exists in substantially similar form in all 
fifty states) prohibits lawyers from entering into funding agreements with funders where the 
lawyer’s future payments are contingent on the lawyer’s receipt of legal fees in one or more 
matters. See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5 (2018) 
(“Litigation Funders’ Contingent Interest in Legal Fees”). That opinion was controversial and 
prompted the New York City Bar to quickly convene a working group to address the issue. The 
working group’s final report concluded that law firm funding benefits clients, and it recommended 
that Rule 5.4 be explicitly amended to permit funding directly between law firms and funders. 
NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 
WORKING GROUP ON LITIGATION FUNDING 20–33 (Feb. 2020). For a discussion of the Rule 5.4 issue, 
see Sebok, Selling Attorneys’ Fees, supra note 21, at 1217–20. 
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litigant’s control over litigation and undermine the attorney’s 
independence.202 
Viewing these rules from a law and economics lens, litigation 
finance seems to undermine “supply-reducing” rules that constrain the 
supply, and thus increase the price, of legal services. This is most 
obviously the case with respect to Rule 5.4’s ban on fee sharing, which 
limits the supply of third-party investment in the legal sphere, 
resulting in decreased competition that is likely to both increase the 
price and decrease the quality of service. The introduction of litigation 
finance—which will increase the supply of legal services and 
competition on price—would thus increase efficiency by reducing price, 
as we have already discussed. 
From an efficiency perspective, it is particularly difficult to 
justify reading these ethical rules to prohibit litigation finance where 
these rules do not prohibit the various methods of third-party financing 
that our legal system already does permit.203 For example, the 
prohibitions against fee sharing and against nonparty control of 
litigation do not stand in the way of contingency fee litigation, pro bono 
litigation, the assignment of claims, the practice of raising equity or 
debt financing to bring a legal claim, moving a legal claim into a special 
purpose vehicle, or selling a special class of shares backed only by a 
company’s litigation, as discussed in Section I.C. The ethical rules thus 
do not stand as a wall against third-party financing, but they may 
prevent the most efficient ways of achieving that third-party financing. 
Realizing these efficiency gains may be particularly justified in contract 
actions involving sophisticated corporate litigants, who may have  
less need for the consumer protection features of the ethics rules  
than individuals. 
III. OTHER CONTEXTS AND LENSES IN  
APPLYING THE UNIFIED FRAMEWORK 
Our analysis suggests that, at least when we apply our unified 
framework through a law and economics efficiency lens to contract 
cases, litigation finance on balance appears to promote both pre- and 
post-dispute efficiency. In this Part, we briefly provide some thoughts 
on other types of disputes where litigation finance might play a  
factor and on how other normative lenses may be applied using our 
unified framework. 
 
 202. Beisner & Rubin, supra note 12, at 1–2. 
 203. See supra Section I.C (discussing the novel aspects of litigation finance). 
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A. Other Contextual Settings of Litigation Finance 
Throughout this Article, we have assumed a hypothetical 
contractual relationship and asked how litigation finance affects 
various aspects of the relationship from its inception to the resolution 
of a contractual breach. While many lawsuits supported by litigation 
funding involve contract claims, financing can be used for virtually any 
lawsuit. Our unified framework can be applied to these other domains 
as well. 
For example, litigation finance has been used in civil class action 
lawsuits.204 Financiers have backed consumers and plaintiff-side law 
firms in funding what are often extremely expensive lawsuits. These 
lawsuits sometimes create large settlements or verdicts, the proceeds of 
which may be used in part to reward financiers for their risk-taking. 
Class action litigation funding may affect a significant range of pre- and 
post-claim incentives, including the behaviors of both consumers and 
companies. For example, if firms know that it is easier to bring class 
action lawsuits, they may seek to take more precaution in their business 
activities. Whether this extra level of precaution is justified or 
beneficial to the marketplace is something that future work should 
elaborate on.205 In addition, firms’ extra precaution may be 
accompanied by riskier behaviors by consumers knowing that they can 
more easily sue a company for damages. Our unified framework can be 
applied to civil class action lawsuits in the same way we have applied 
it to contract relationships. 
In addition, there has been an increase in the instances of class 
action false advertising litigation due in part to advances in empirical 
methodologies of estimating damages.206 Given that these lawsuits are 
often expensive and consumers do not have the financial wherewithal 
 
 204. See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 9 (discussing the social costs and benefits of third-
party litigation financing of class action suits); Molot, supra note 9 (discussing the intricacies of 
third-party financing, including examples of class action suits); Steinitz, supra note 21 (discussing, 
as an example, corporate litigants as consumers of third-party financing to defend against class 
action suits). 
 205. Much legal scholarship has been devoted to analyzing the requisite amount of precaution 
that firms should take when engaging in behavior that affects consumers. See, e.g., STEVEN 
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 175–76 (1987) (discussing the incentives of 
limited liability on firm precaution); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 263–64 (2004) (discussing the basic theory of bearing risk under accident law); Steven 
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1980) (describing the differences 
in precaution taken under negligence rules). 
 206. See generally Suneal Bedi & David Reibstein, Damaged Damages: Errors in Patent and 
False Advertising Litigation (Kelley Sch. of Bus. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 19-40, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3440817 [https://perma.cc/N62X-5DTS] 
(discussing how choice-based conjoint methods are currently misapplied in estimating damages 
and the consequences of such misapplication).  
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to bring these lawsuits, litigation finance may increase this species of 
litigation. This in turn may have incentive-based consequences to 
brands when they decide what kinds of advertising campaigns  
to launch.  
Litigation finance is also increasingly common in patent 
infringement lawsuits. Patent rights are readily alienable, and a 
market has long existed where patent owners can sell their patents to 
more efficient enforcers of the patent rights. There is a lively debate 
about whether nonpracticing entities or “patent trolls” are a net positive 
for the patent system.207 Whatever the merits of that debate, the Patent 
Act expressly authorizes the transfer of patents, which are given “the 
attributes of personal property.”208 If this is so, then at least from an 
efficiency perspective, we might be agnostic as to whether the patent is 
financed through an outright sale of the patent to a third-party willing 
to bear litigation costs or through a litigation finance agreement that 
does not actually transfer ownership. Even if the latter route is banned, 
the former is still permissible, and so we might prefer to allow the 
patentholder to pursue whichever of the two paths is most efficient. 
One further example: civil lawsuits against government entities 
(states, national, cities, etc.) may also be advanced with the help of 
litigation finance.209 The ability of citizens to more easily and cheaply 
sue governments raises several interesting questions around 
accountability and precautionary measures. Even though it is currently 
rare for litigation finance to be used against a public entity, our unified 
framework can still be applied to such a relationship because we predict 
that there would be behavioral effects before, during, and after a 
potential dispute, even when the dispute is against a governing entity. 
B. Other Normative Lens to Apply the Unified Framework 
In this Article, we have asked whether litigation finance 
promotes efficiency. But there are other values the legal system can 
promote. A fruitful avenue for further research would be to apply our 
 
 207. For discussions of the “patent troll” debate, see, for example, John R. Allison, Mark A. 
Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-
Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009) (analyzing the features of common patent litigation 
to describe the role of patent owners); Tun-Jen Chiang, Trolls and Orphans, 96 B.U. L. REV. 691 
(2016) (discussing the implications of holdup within patent law); Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. 
Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1450 (2013) 
(describing the ease of patent assertion). 
 208. 35 U.S.C. § 261. 
 209. Qui tam suits are one area where third-party funding appears to be particularly 
prevalent. See Ruckh v. Salus Rehabilitation, LLC, 963 F.3d 1089, 1101–03 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(holding that the False Claims Act does not bar third-party funding and that accepting third-party 
funding did not deprive a relator of standing to sue). 
            
618 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3:563 
unified framework to evaluate litigation finance through these various 
other normative lenses. 
For example, when it comes to welfare distributions, efficiency 
seeks to foster Pareto efficient distributions. A Rawlsian framework, 
however, would advocate for a very different set of distributional 
principles. John Rawls prescribed a distribution principle where any 
inequalities must be set up so as to benefit the least well-off in society.210 
This is Rawls’s so called “difference principle,” which he arrives at from 
his original position.211 According to Rawls, we should tolerate 
inequities as long as they help the poorest in society. On his theory, the 
difference principle justifies things such as redistribution of income by 
government entities, taxation, charitable giving, and so on.212 
Viewing litigation finance through a Rawlsian lens might 
prescribe different policy outcomes than those suggested by our 
efficiency lens. For example, some have argued that litigation finance 
encourages frivolous lawsuits and hence creates inefficiencies. 
Assuming these arguments have merit, the inefficiencies and frivolous 
lawsuits, under a Rawlsian lens, may be tolerable so long as litigation 
finance otherwise helps those who are least well-off advance their  
legal claims. 
In contrast to Rawls, we could also apply a libertarian lens 
similar to that espoused by Robert Nozick. Nozick’s distributional 
requirements are quite minimal. Under his account, as long as parties 
have acquired their wealth through legal means, there should be no 
form of redistribution.213 Nozick might view any government 
 
 210. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75 (1971) (introducing the difference principle).  
 211. The original position consists of citizens coming together to make decisions on how 
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restrictions on third-party financing of litigation as inefficient and 
unwarranted, and thus might oppose any and all regulations of 
litigation finance. 
Still yet, general concepts of justice might evaluate litigation 
finance differently than the economic efficiency we used above. While 
we argued above that lawsuits would be more efficiently run with 
financiers, a staunch supporter of individual civil justice may argue 
that this takes away power from those individuals who are personally 
aggrieved by the defendant’s wrongful conduct. For this lens, justice is 
more than just an efficient state of affairs. Rather, the value is allowing 
a party to actively participate in seeking justice for herself. This 
normative lens would favorably view litigation finance’s ability to help 
poorer claimholders to vindicate their rights, though it might 
disapprove of the fact that the claimholder might receive a smaller 
portion of case proceeds as a result of the third party’s assistance. 
The point we make here is simply that more work still needs to 
be done before we can fully understand how litigation finance 
descriptively and normatively affects our legal system. We have 
concluded that, in applying a law and economics lens to a contractual 
relationship, litigation finance promotes efficiency in the legal system 
and the marketplace at large. Future scholars should use our unified 
framework and apply it to other legal claims and normative lenses. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have provided the first unified framework for 
evaluating the welfare implications of litigation finance. Importantly, 
this framework combines existing scholarship that focuses on the post-
claim effects of litigation finance with the largely unnoticed and 
undeveloped pre-claim effects of litigation finance. 
In highlighting these pre-claim effects and providing a unified 
framework, we draw attention to what is new about litigation finance, 
and we attempt to raise awareness of funding among regulators, 
lawyers, and financiers. Ultimately, we argue that our unified 
framework leads us to conclude that litigation finance does promote 
welfare and increase efficiency in the marketplace. We hope our 
analysis encourages future scholarship to (1) empirically measure the 
pre-claim and post-claim effects we highlight and measure their welfare 
impact, and (2) apply our unified framework in different legal contexts 
and with different normative lenses. 
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To better evaluate funding, regulators and scholars need a 
complete picture of the welfare implications of this growing form of 
financing. Only when there is a robust scholarship fully evaluating all 
the behavioral implications of litigation finance can we uncover the 
complete picture and hence be confident that we have the right policy 
treatment for litigation finance. 
